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ABSTRACT

This Article addresses, against the backdrop of possible legislative reforms in Australia, the tension between the desire to eliminate racial defamation and the need to protectfreedom of speech. In an historicaloverview, Mr. Partlett notes an increasing sensitivity to racial issues in
Australia in the face of an assumed but nebulously stated value offree
speech. Mr. Partlett analyzes theoretical and legal approaches to free
speech from Commonwealth and United States perspectives, and analysis
of recent legal and social developments in civil rights in the United
States makes this Article relevant for both Commonwealth and United
States reformers in this area of the law. He concludes that the interest
served by free speech is the individual's interest of autonomy. Thus, the
aim to promote individual autonomy, accompanied by a presumption
favoring free speech and a healthy suspicion of government, legitimates
cautious governmental regulation of speech. Government action in this
area is best expressed through government's role as a speaker on moral
matters and through the institutional competence of the courts. Mr. Par* THE RED LION SQUARE DISORDERS 15 JUNE 1974, .CMND. No. 5919.
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tlett then analyzes the recommendations of the AustralianHuman Rights
Commission to amend Australia's 1975 Racial DiscriminationAct and
finds that its attempts to outlaw racial defamation and incitement to racial hatred neglect the value of free speech. Mr. Partlettproposes two
alternatives for achieving a more comfortable balance-alternatives
through which government may symbolically condemn incidents of racial
defamation yet give sufficient ambit to the exercise offree speech.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ..................................
ESSENTIAL BACKGROUND:

RACIAL ISSUES IN AUSTRA-

LIA'S SOCIAL AND LEGAL HISTORY .................

III.

IV.

A . The R oots .................................
B. DiscriminatoryLegislation ....................
C. Post Second World War......................
D. Free Speech: A Fragile Liberty ................
A GUIDING FRAMEWORK ..................
A. The Dilemma ........................
B. Theoretical Foundations...............
C. A Traverse of the Territory ............
D. Bollinger's Tolerance .................
E. Liberal Theory ......................
THE

A.
B.
C.
D.
V.

VI.

.......
.......
.......
.......
.......
.......
ROLE OF GOVERNMENT ...............
.......
The Frameworkfor Reform ............
.......
The Government as Speaker ...........
.......
The Common Law and the Courts ...... .......
Conclusion ..........................
.......

AN ATTEMPTED RESOLUTION:

THE DEBATE IN

437
437
439
441
443
445
445
452
454
459
462
466
466
466
470
473

AUS-

TRALIA ............................................

473

A.
B.
C.
D.

473
478
480
482
485

Proposalsfor Reform: Background and Resolution
The Impact of the Recommendations ............
The Weakness of the Recommendations .........
A Short Commentary on the Common Law ......

CONCLUSION ........................................
I.

INTRODUCTION

Those landing on the Fatal Shore in the first fleet in 1788 encountered
inquisitive Aborigines who had occupied this vast landmass for 40,000
years and who had developed a society superbly adapted to a nomadic
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life in the most arid of lands.' European settlement changed forever, and
dislocated, the patterns of life of those Aborigines of which much was
said in Australia's 1988 Bicentennial Year.2 Convict transportation, a
trickle of free settlement, and, later in the 19th century, gold fever,3 established a European-predominantly English, Scottish, and Irish-outpost in the Antipodes. With this came many of the accoutrements of
4
English culture including, of course, the common law.
Asian immigration to the gold fields in the late 19th century, a large
non-English immigration after the Second World War, and, more recently, a significant Asian immigration, both of refugees and of those
under established migrant quotas, have in their turn transformed Australian attitudes and life.
Race issues, then, have been a part of Australian history from the time
of the First Fleet. British justice extended to Aborigines, but the realities
of isolation, the need for land that could be securely stocked, and the
frequent contact with brutalized convicts dictated the frequent absence of
that justice. Except for repressive and discriminatory laws directed particularly to Asians in the late 19th century, little was felt of racial issues
in legal theaters until the early 1970s; those years saw state and federal
antidiscrimination laws enacted.
Recently, it has been suggested that Parliament should act against extremist racist propaganda and defamation-speech that attacks racial or
ethnic groups, branding them as inferior and stirring up loathing and
hatred. Unlike the antidiscrimination legislation, these suggestions have
made little progress.5
The reasons for the reluctance of lawmakers are complex. Certainly
an idealism present in the early 1970s is absent in the pragmatic 1980s.
Very few votes are to be won with this kind of legislation. Along with
1. R.M. BERNDT & C.H. BERNDT, THE WORLD OF THE FIRST AUSTRALIANS
(1964); Wright, Landscape and Dreaming, 114 DAEDALUS 29, 31 (1985).
2. See Starke, Commonwealth ParliamentaryResolutions on the Aboriginal Occupation of Australia, 62 AUSTL. L.J. 978-80 (1988); Lumb, Aboriginal Land Rights: Judicial Approaches in Perspective, 62 AUSTL. L.J. 273 (1988); Nettheim, Indigenous
Rights, Human Rights and Australia 61 AUSTL. L.J. 291 (1987). On the Aboriginal
Treaty Committee, see B. HOCKING, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ABORIGINAL HUMAN
RIGHTS (1988). See generally J. MCCORQUODALE, ABORIGINES AND THE LAW: A DiGEST (1987); H.C. COOMBS, TRIAL BALANCE 291-95, 297-300 (1981) (political background to the change in government's involvement in Aboriginal affairs).
3. J. MONAGHAN, AUSTRALIANS AND THE GOLD RUSH-CALIFORNIA DOWN
UNDER 1849-1854 (1966); C. CHOI, CHINESE MIGRATION AND SETTLEMENT IN AusTRALIA 17-35 (1975).
4. A. CASTLES, AN AUSTRALIAN LEGAL HISTORY (1982).
5. See infra Part II, section B, and Part IV.
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this vulgar factor 'is
one of genuine social policy: the potential possessed
by racial defamation legislation to infringe freedom of speech. In the face
of present, and probable, law reform recommendations and the vigor of
free speech arguments, Australia presents a grand opportunity to observe
a resolution of the contending forces. Its affinity in values with Britain
and the United States suggests that lessons on a broader canvas can be
drawn from the Australian dilemma. Furthermore, it provides a satisfying subject because one's musings may be heeded by reformers of the
law.
However, it is this broader canvas that justifies the presence of this
Article on these pages. The Australian dilemma is precisely the dilemma
of nations whose society adheres to the values of diversity, liberty, and
personal autonomy. The hardest test for the law as both a regulator and
a conveyor and articulator of justice6 is at the pressure points where values contend.7 The law at its best reconciles basic values through mechanisms that assure individuals and groups that their beliefs count.8 Roe v.
Wade' has failed because it excluded an entire belief system held by a
large group in society "to the detriment of our pluralistic society."'" In
Dean Calabresi's terms that group is "emarginated.""
To look at the issue at hand from first principles stripped of the accumulations of first amendment presuppositions should engage Americans
at a time when racial defamation seems resurgent in that most pluralistic, tolerant, and influential Western institution-the university.1 2 A
comparative view allows this fresh perspective where our mission is the
same. This view, however, must be tempered by an appreciation of differences in social and legal culture.1 3
Racial defamation is speech which is published and identifies racial,
ethnic or religious groups in such a way that members of that group will
6.

P.

ATIYAH

& R.

SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW:

A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL REASONING, LEGAL THEORY, AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 4, 5 (1987) [hereinafter ATIYAH].
7. G. CALABRESI & P. BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES 19-22, 195-99 (1978).

8. Id. at 67-68.
9. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
10. G. CALABRESl, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES, AND THE LAW 97 (1985) (The
group in the case of abortion comprises those who view abortion as morally wrong). See
generally M.A. GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 10-62 (1987)
(ways of thinking more broadly about the complexities of abortion).
11. G. CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 98.

12. See Barringer, Campus Battle Pitts Freedom of Speech Against Racial Slurs,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 25, 1989, § 1, at 1, col. 1.
13. See ATIYAH, supra note 6, at 3 (mode of legal reasoning closely correlated with
historical, cultural, and institutional factors).
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tend to suffer social embarrassment, humiliation, and ostracism. It is
speech that asserts false facts either boldly or, more problematically, disguised in opinion. It should be contrasted with speech that incites violence. This latter speech is subject to government proscription and does
not give rise to the acute problems of racial defamation proscription.
Other Western liberal democracies have tackled the issue of racial defamation. In Britain,1" Canada,15 New Zealand,1 6 and Western Europe,1
examples of varying legislative proscription of this type of speech are
readily found. In contrast, in the United States, legislation of this type is
conspicuous in its absence."' This dissonance is perplexing for an Australian presented with the Robert Frost choice of divergent paths. 9
Part II of this Article will sketch the place of racial issues in Australia's social and legal background. The idea of freedom of speech cannot
be divorced from this background or culture. Much of the Australian
debate to date has lacked a principled framework for reaching a resolution between the vying camps. On the one hand, free speech has been
assumed to be self-defining, and, hence, little thought has been given to
its limits within a liberal Western democracy. On the other, racial defamation is taken as an invidious practice that justifies far-reaching legislative prohibition. The obvious tension between these approaches to racial
defamation has never received adequate attention.
Part III seeks to provide a framework to guide the reformer/pilgrim.
Let it be said, though, that the theory of free speech is its own kind of
14. Race Relations Act, 1976, ch. 74, § 70. See I.A. MACDONALD, RACE RELATIONS: THE NEW LAW 472-487 (1977). This Act has been the subject of a number of
inquiries. See THE RED LION SQUARE DISORDERS 15 JUNE 1974, CMND. No. 5919;
REPORT BY LORD SCARMAN, THE BRIXTON DISORDERS 10-12 APRIL 1981, CMND.
No. 8427 [hereinafter THE BRIXTON DISORDERS]; see also Public Order Act, 1986, ch.
69, §§ 17-22.
15. R.S.C. ch. C-34 §§ 281.1-.2 (1970) (current version at R.S.C. ch. C-46, §§
319.1-.2 (1985)); Civil Rights Protection Act, ch. 12, 1981 B.C. Stat 69; Act of 4 May

1979, ch. S-24.1 § 14, 1979 Sask. Stat. 342 (respecting the Saskatchwan Code of Human
Rights and its Administration); Human Rights Act, ch. 65 § 2, 1974 Man. Stat. 567.
16. Race Relations Act, 1977, § 9A (N.Z. 1977).
17. See Lasson, Racial Defamation As Free Speech: Abusing the First Amendment,

17 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 11, 50-53 (1985) (discussing European legislation). See
also E. Stein, History Against Free Speech: The New German Law Against the "Auschwitz"-And Other-"Lies," 85 MICH. L. REV. 277 (1986) (discussing West German
law).
18. Some states have these statutes on their books. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
53-37 (West 1985); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 98C (West 1970); W. VA.
CODE § 61-10-16 (1984).
19. R. FROST, The Road Not Taken, in THE POETRY OF ROBERT FROST 231 (R.
Brower ed. 1963).
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Serbonian bog. (We have much for which to thank Milton in the free
speech area).20 And the journey between free speech and racial defamation is redolent of that between Charybdis and Scylla. We all may agree
that gutter press publishing of vile racial vituperation is harmful; like
pornography, it may be valueless speech and not deserving of protection
from state proscription.2 However, this speech is political, and we must
be wary of governmental regulation. Should, for example, the government ban the publication of scientific studies demonstrating differences
in I.Q.s of various racial or ethnic groups? Or should debate about
Asian immigration be censored?
American first amendment jurisprudence may serve as a benchmark.
My argument is that in a liberal democratic society, governmental interference must be carefully justified in terms of protection of individual
autonomy. Free speech often protects this interest by nurturing the values of toleration and pluralism. But free speech also may be destructive
of individual autonomy, especially when it is perceived that the autonomy of individuals in a racial or ethnic group is intimately connected to
their group. This must be more compelling in a society that recognizes
the goals of racial equality. Nevertheless, the imperative quality of free
speech demands the most carefully modulated of governmental interference. The presumption is that free speech in an imperfect world where
one should be suspicious of government is our best guardian of basic
values. Here the symbolic role of government as speaker in promoting
what is right22 and the institutional competence of the courts provides a
way of protecting the autonomy of individuals while maintaining a vigorous free speech principle. These are matters expounded upon in Part
IV.
Part V examines this debate as it has emerged in Australia. The recommendations of the Australian Human Rights Commission will be discussed.23 In addition, the untapped possibilities of common-law develop-

20.

See, e.g., J.

MAJOR PROSE

MILTON,

Areopagitica, in

JOHN MILTON: COMPLETE POEMS AND

716 (M.Y. Hughes ed. 1957).

21. See ATr'Y GEN. COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY: FINAL REPORT 405-418
(1986) (child pornography); see also Sable Comm., Inc. v. FCC, Nos. 88-515, 88-525
(US. S.Ct. June 23, 1989) (LExis 3135 Genfed Library, Courts file) (First Amendment
protection does not extend to obscene speech). But see American Library Ass'n v. Thornburgh, No. 89-0611 (D.D.C. May 16, 1989) (LExIS 5399 Genfed Library, Dist. file)
(Revercomb, J., declared unconstitutional and enjoined enforcement of several provisions
of the 1988 Child Protection and Obscenity Enforcement Act).
22. Welch, The State as a Purveyor of Morality, 56 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 540
(1988).
23. The Commission has been renamed the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity
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ment will be briefly investigated. This discussion proceeds in the context
of the framework developed in Part IV.
In the Conclusion, I will offer some constructive suggestions for possible reforms. No solution proferred elsewhere may be taken off the shelf
and applied in Australia. Neither strategies in the Commonwealth nor in
the United States appropriately respond to the imperatives of the problem given rise to by racial defamation. The reform I have in mind will
create the machinery, through legislation, to afford an opportunity by
which those defamed may have their day in court, but the legislation will
be framed to protect free speech. Government in this symbolic way
makes a statement about values, and the courts-as the appropriate social institution-may comment upon the specifics of particular cases
brought before them. Freedom of speech is retained while the harm of
racial defamation is mitigated. It may lack the force that proponents
would seek, and this for good reason-for this legislation is mainly symbolic. To arm the legislation not only is to hazard an erosion of free
speech but also, by highlighting the gulf between formal powers and real
world futility, may damage the goals of community racial harmony. It is
an imperfect solution for an imperfect world.
II.

ESSENTIAL BACKGROUND: RACIAL ISSUES IN AUSTRALIA'S
SOCIAL AND LEGAL HISTORY

A.

The Roots

Captain Phillip was commissioned as Captain-General and Governorin-Chief of the territory of New South Wales in 1787.24 He was to captain the First Fleet and administer the colony to be established at Botany
Bay, a site discovered by Captain James Cook in 1770. In contrast to the
settlement of the American colonies, the pioneers of the First Fleet were
not seeking freedom. Rather, they were being transferred from miserable
imprisonment in England to incomprehensible isolation and banishment
in New South Wales. 5 America was born in hope, Australia in despair.
Phillip was to be dictator of the colony with responsibility to the Colonial Office in London. His instructions ran from detail of how convicts
were to be employed to requirements of further exploration, including
colonization of Norfolk Island. He was to open an intercourse with the
natives, conciliate their affections, and enjoin all subjects to live in amity
Commission. Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986, No. 125,
1986 Austl. Acts § 7, at 2567, 2573 (1986).
24. 1 C.M. CLARK, A HISTORY OF AUSTRALIA 79 (1962).
25. For a vivid description, see R. HUGHES, THE FATAL SHORE 1-18 (1987).
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and kindness with them. He was to ascertain their numbers and to punish those who wantonly destroyed them or interrupted their occupation.
Lastly, he was required to report in what manner involvement with
them could be turned to the Colony's advantage.2 6
This noble injunction was soon tested in the realities of the penal colony established just north of Botany Bay at Port Jackson, later to become Sydney.17 Friction mounted between the Aborigines and the convicts; property deprivations by the convicts elicited violent response by
the Aborigines. Phillip forbade punitive expeditions and reacted to one
retaliatory attack against Aborigines, in which one convict was killed, by
having the survivors flogged and placed in leg irons for a year.2" The
convicts resented this extension of the King's peace to Aborigines. They
dearly wished for an official recognition of a class lower than themselves.2" This became magnified as the degradation of the surrounding
tribes became manifest."0 The noble savage image, generated from
Cook's descriptions and romantically adhered to in genteel English society, eroded. But still the criminal law was even-handed."1 The murder of
two Aborigine boys as revenge for the murder of settlers in 1799 could
not be defended on the grounds that Aborigines were treacherous, evilminded, and bloodthirsty. 2 The perpetrators were found guilty, and
Governor King, who had replaced Phillip, reminded the colonists that
killing natives would "be punished with the utmost severity of the Law."
The Governor, however, conscious of the sensibilities of an infant colony
to a hanging, relented and conceded that the sentences of hanging would
be commuted. 3 As the colony grew, the official policy of equality before

26.
27.
28.
29.

1 C.M. CLARK, supra note 24, at 79-80.
For a description of the reasons for this location, see id. 59-89.
R. HUGHES, supra note 25, at 94.
Id. at 95. This is endemic in human social affairs. See T. SOWELL, THE EcoNOMICS AND POLITICS OF RACE: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPEGTIVE (1983); J.H. ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 158 (1980).
30. 1 C.M. CLARK, supra note 24, at 110 (discussing the "taint of European civilization-its destructive effect on all primitive cultures with which it came into contact.
Not one of the faiths sustaining these men-neither the Christian religion, the enlightenment, nor romantic notions about noble savages-could restrain the rapacity and greed of
the white man, nor afford him a workable explanation for the backwardness and material weakness of the aborigine.")
31. J.F. STEPHEN, A DIGEST OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 112-13 (L. Sturge 8th ed.
1947) (Article 140 "Kidnapping Pacific Islanders" and analysis of the Pacific Islanders
Act, 1872).
32. 1 C.M. CLARK, supra note 24, at 145.
33. R. HUGHES, supra note 25, at 275.
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the law belied the realities of Aborigine and white relations.34 The exigencies of settlement, the gulf in understanding competing cultures, and
primitive communications in the newly settled areas ensured that the
principles of criminal justice had, at best, a tenuous hold. 5 Nonetheless,
maintenance of the principle remained.
B.

DiscriminatoryLegislation

The Aborigines had never posed a sufficiently great economic threat to
trigger the invocation of discriminatory legislation. Their want of strict
property rights, in a European sense, imposed no constraint on European expansion; Aborigines simply did not enter and compete in the
commercial life of the colony. 6 It was a different matter, however, when
gold was discovered in the mid-19th century. The ensuing rush brought
population and wealth. It also brought relatively large numbers of Chi37
nese immigrants.
Riots erupted as the Chinese competed with the European diggers
hailing from Australia, Britain, and America. Legislation was recommended to check the flow of Chinese. 8 In June 1855 the Victorian Parliament passed an "Act to make provisions for Certain Immigrants."
Legislation was passed in the contiguous colonies of New South Wales
and South Australia to prevent Chinese arrivals walking the several
weeks necessary to reach the Victorian gold fields. This was repeated in
other colonies. When gold was discovered in Queensland in the 1870s,
all plans to import Chinese coolies for labor were abandoned, and legislation proposed to impose a heavy gold fields' license fee for "Asiatic and
African aliens." The British government blocked the legislation,3" but
colonial outrage eventually won the day. By 1896 five of the colonies had
chosen to extend the provisions of the Chinese exclusion acts to all
Asians.40 The exclusion of Chinese and "other Asiatics" from the gold
fields forced them into other niches in the economy, in particular laundries and furniture making, where they would face further state sup34. Id. at 276-78.
35. This gulf between ideas and practice was the subject of an excellent book by E.
EGGLESTON, FEAR, FAVOUR OR AFFECTION: ABORIGINES AND THE CRIMINAL LAW IN

(1976).
36. For a detailed description of the place of Aboriginal communities in Australian
society, see 2 C.D. ROWLEY, OUTCASTS IN WHITE AUSTRALIA: ABORIGINAL POLICY
VICTORIA, SOUTH AUSTRALIA AND WESTERN AUSTRALIA

AND PRACTICE

37.
38.
39.
40.

(1971).

See C. CHOI, supra note 3, 17-35 (description of Chinese migration).
This was often the fate of overseas Chinese. See T. SOWELL, supra note 29.
C. CHOI, supra note 3, at 25.
Id. at 27.
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ported discrimination.41
At the time of Australia's federation at the turn of the century, restrictive legislation was rife. The Founding Fathers ignobly accepted that
state of affairs in drafting the Australian Constitution.42 One of the enumerated constitutional powers of the Federal Parliament entitled it to
carry on the tradition and to make laws regarding "[t]he people of any
race for whom it is deemed necessary to make special laws." 43 Sixtyseven years later, with more noble intent, and in one of the few successful referenda amending the Constitution, this provision was amended to
excise the words relating to the Aboriginal race, thus allowing the Commonwealth Parliament to assume responsibility for Aborigines.4 4
The contemplation of continued discriminatory legislation in the states
also ensured defeat of suggestions that an equal protection clause,
modeled along the lines of the fourteenth amendment of the United
States Constitution, be included in the Constitution. 45 The draft provision worried a Victorian politician who opined that the state's factories
legislation would be avoided because it included discriminatory provisions against the Chinese, born of a resentment to their "sweating" practices in the furniture trade.46 Other states warned that their legislation
banning Asians and Asiatics from the gold fields would be in jeopardy
under an equal protection provision. 47 The extent of repressive legislation grew proportionally as Australian colonies achieved more extensive
self-government i the nineteenth century. Majority rule in Australia, as
41. Id. at 33. Redolent of discriminatory legislation in United States, see, e.g., In re
Ah Fong, 1 F. Cas. 213 (C.C.D. Cal. 1874) (No. 102) (voiding California law blocking
habeas corpus); In re Tiburcio Parrott, 1 F. 481 (C.C.D. Cal. 1880) (voiding California
law imposing criminal sanctions on anyone employing a Chinese or Mongolian person);
Baker v. Portland, 2 F. Cas. 472 (C.C.D. Or. 1879) (No. 777) (voiding Oregon law
prohibiting employment of Chinese on street improvement or public works projects). See
generally McClain, The Chinese Struggle for Civil Rights in Nineteenth Century
America: The First Phase, 1850-1870, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 529 (1984) and Fritz, A
Nineteenth Century "Habeas Corpus Mill": The Chinese before the Federal Courts in
California, 32 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 347 (1988).
42. J.A. LANAUZE, THE MAKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION 165, 229232 (1972).
43. AUSTL. CONST. §51 (xxvi). Before its alteration by Act of 10 August 1967, No.
55, § 2, section fifty-one read: "The people of any race, other than the aboriginal race in
any State, for whom it is deemed necessary to make special laws."
44. 2 C.D. ROWLEY, supra note 36, at 420-21 (seeing hope that the federal powers
could lead to a national policy). For a more extended analysis, see C.D. ROWLEY, A
MATTER OF JUSTICE (1978).
45. J.A. LANAUZE, supra note 42, at 227, 231-32.
46. Id. at 231.
47. Id. at 231-32.
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elsewhere, did not guarantee equality or fair treatment." Public sentiment was racist, in those times sitting comfortably with patriotism and
imperialism."9 The words of Australia's war historian, C.E.W. Bean,
captured the spirit: "The Australian is fighting the coloured nations of
the East today in the same cause in which Themistocles fought with
Xerxes, Pompey with Mithridates, Richard of the Lion Heart with the
Saracens, and Charles Martel with the Moors." 5 Aborigines were
treated at worst cruelly and at best with morale-destroying paternalism. 5'
C. Post Second World War
The Second World War showed that Australia was strategically vulnerable. The slogan "Populate or Perish" accompanied a large scale immigration program.52 Many migrants were drawn from non-British
homelands and their numbers were augmented by the multitudes whose
lives had been dislocated by war. This diversity diminished the old xenophobia, and as international disapprobation of racially-based policies increased, the restrictive immigration policies eventually fell.
By the 1950s and 1960s, Australia was successfully absorbing new
immigrants. Some difficulties of assimilation were apparent. 3 Similarly,
the plight of the Aborigines was partially uncovered to those Australians
living in the cities who did not witness Aborigines' circumstances at first
hand.54 But this did not elicit legislation to protect persons from discrimination. It was only in the early 1970s with the election of Whitlam's
activitist Labor party that government took action. Admittedly, much of
that government's social reform agenda was frustrated by a hostile Sen-

48. T. SOWELL, supra note 29, at 164 (noting that the return of popular government
in the South during the Jacksonian period in the United States brought "disenfranchisement of the blacks, and racial segregation and discrimination on an unprecedented
scale."); C.D. ROWLEY, THE DESTRUCTION OF ABORIGINAL SOCIETY (1970). During
the Civil War period feelings against Jews were also manifested. See J.M. MCPHERSON,
BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 441-442, 622-623 (1988).
49. G. SOUTER, LION AND KANGAROO: THE INITIATION OF AUSTRALIA 19011919, at 188 (1976).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 188-190.

52. G.SHERINGTON, AUSTRALIA'S IMMIGRANTS, 1788-1978, at 127-61 (1980).
53. See A.H. RICHMOND, IMMIGRATION AND ETHNIC CONFLICT (1988); H.I.
LONDON, NON-WHITE IMMIGRATION AND THE "WHITE AUSTRALIA" POLICY (1970);
A.T. YARWOOD, ATTITUDES TO NON-EUROPEAN IMMIGRATION (1968).
54. 2 C.D. ROWLEY, supra note 36, at 383-450 (detailing increasing awareness, responses, strategies, and prospects for greater equality).
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ate. But so much had the perceptions of the unfairness of race discrimination changed that the Parliament passed the Racial Discrimination
Act of 1975 with support of the Conservative opposition. No one of good
conscience, it seemed, could argue against the worthiness of that legislation-especially when stiffened by international anti-racial pressures at a
time when Australia was beginning to assert a new independence in for55
eign relations.
The Racial Discrimination Act broadly prohibits discrimination
against persons on the basis of race, color, or ethnic origin in, among
other things, employment, accommodation, services, and administration
of justice. The Act also established the Office for Community Relations,
with the functions of research, education, investigation of complaints,
and conciliation of disputes.56
At the same time, a Human Rights Bill was drafted and introduced
into Parliament." In contrast to the Racial Discrimination Act this
caused a great deal of controversy, and was defeated. This legislation
would have given rights to citizens derived from the Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights. State legislation would have been subject to the preemptive power of the Commonwealth.58 In the absence of proscription of
racial discrimination, the vague provisions of the bill could not command
support of all political factions, and was doomed. The subsequent Conservative (Liberal-Country Party Coalition) government enacted a
Human Rights Commission Act 59 without the earlier legislation's farreaching consequences, in particular its self-executing aspects. In the

55. The "principle of racial non-discrimination" is part of the jus cogens of international law. See I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 513 (3d ed.
1979) (numbering racial non-discrimination among the principles of jus cogens if such
principles in fact exist). It is pertinent, then, that the power of the Commonwealth Parliament to enact this legislation was mainly derived from an exercise of the foreign affairs constitutional placitum implementing the 1965 International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. The High Court of Australia upheld
the constitutionality of the Racial Discrimination Act, in Koowarta v. Bjelke-Petersen,
153 C.L.R. 168 (1982). For a description of Australia's greater independence in foreign
relations, see T.B. MILLAR, AUSTRALIA'S FOREIGN POLICY (1968).
56. See Partlett, The Racial DiscriminationAct 1975 and the Anti-Discrimination
Act 1977: Aspects and Proposalsfor Change 2 U. NEw S. WALES L.J. 152 (1977)
(discussing this and various anti-discrimination legislation).
57. See Evans, New Directions in Australian Race Relations Law, 48 AUSTL. L.J.
479, 481 (1974); see generally Current Topics, 60 AUSTL. L.J. 117-208 (1986) (the
AUSTL. L.J. "Human Rights" Issue).
58. AUSTL. CONST. § 109. Compare U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (analogous United
States constitutional authority regarding preemption).
59. No. 24, 1981 Austl. Acts.
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pantheon of rights, freedom from invidious racial discrimination held a
preeminent position quite at odds with its nineteenth century evaluation.
Affirming the status of the anti-racial discrimination principle, some
states also hastened to enact anti-discrimination legislation, necessitating
that the Commonwealth work out a modus vivendi with those states in
order to avoid clashes in jurisdiction. 0 Australia mercurially changed
from a desert to a jungle of competing regimes. Standout states, like
Queensland, were branded as antediluvian. 6
D. Free Speech: A FragileLiberty
The sovereignty of Parliament is not legally constrained by notions of
individual free speech.6 2 Free speech had little place in the penal colony
established in Botany Bay; it was a totalitarian place.63 No fundamental
freedoms were entrenched in Australia's constitution. But as mentioned,
along with the convicts came the common law. Within the interstices of
that law, the courts had instilled a protean free speech presumption.
This comported with the libertarian base of the common law as it
emerged in the nineteenth century.64 Accordingly, while no constitutional
protection could be relied upon, the common law together with a social
65
ethic might coalesce to give protection to the value.
60. Racial Discrimination Act, S. Austl. Acts (1976); Anti-Discrimination Act, No.
48, N.S.W. Stat., 1 (1977); Equal Opportunity Act, No., 100995, Vict. Act 6881, (1984).
61.

G.

NETTHEIM, OUTLAWED:

QUEENSLAND'S ABORIGINES AND ISLANDERS AND

(1973).
62. For discussion of the sovereignty of Parliament, see O'Neill, The Australian
Bills of Rights Bill 1985 and the Supremacy of Parliament,60 AUSTL. L.J. 139 (1986);
E. WADE & G. PHILLIPS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 46-61 (8th ed. 1970); L. ZINES,
COMMENTARIES ON THE AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION 64-68, 90-92 (1977); see also
A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 3985 (10th ed. 1959); Walker, Dicey's Dubious Dogma of Parlimentary Sovereignty: A
Recent Fray with Freedom of Religion, 59 AUSTL. L.J. 276 (1985).
63. R. HUGHES, supra note 25, at 114-116, 286-322.
THE RULE OF LAW

64. 0.

HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW

(1881). The rise of freedom of contract was

based upon faith in individual choice making; for a rich discussion of the law and intellectual background, see P. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT
(1979). Society is not a pure reflection of the law for Dicey. See A.V. DICEY, LAW AND
PUBLIC OPINION IN ENGLAND DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 1-16 (1905)
(describing the period of 1865-1900 as "collectivist"). But see ATIYAH, supra, at 231-37.
Laissez-faire was compatible with the increase in legislation. See Woodard, Reality and
Social Reform: The Transitionfrom Laissez-Faire to the Welfare State, 72 YALE L.J.
286, 290-91 (1962).
65. In Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2) 3 W.L.R. 776, 808
(H.L. 1988) (Lord Goff commented that "freedom of speech has existed in this country
perhaps as long as, if not longer than, it has existed in any other country in the world").
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This value could not resist determined government repressions as existed in the early years. But later, when the social ethic was conducive,
the courts would import the value into lawmaking functions. The courts
have construed legislation in light of a presumption in favor of free
speech; should the legislature wish to restrict free speech, it had to be
plain on the face of the statute. For example, if the legislature should
abrogate the rule of legal professional privilege it must be express; the
common-law interest of freedom of communication between solicitor and
client-a species of free speech-may not be overturned by inference. 6
Away from statutory interpretation, the courts often have attempted to
protect free speech in fashioning rules. The law of defamation, for example, maintains defenses that attempt to balance harm to reputation
against exercise of free speech, and the law of confidence in equity protects speech balanced against the public interest in maintaining the vitality of a given relationship.6"
For all this, free speech in Australia has never assumed a rhetorical
power base in public and political debate. It has appeared more as a
theoretical artifact of the intellectual .6 The want of a constitutional protection makes it too nebulous a value in a Benthamite society to effectively counter governmental action.6" No standard is available under
which the troops may be marshaled. Although this does not doom public
arguments based upon appeal to the free speech principle, it certainly

66. Baker v. Campbell, 49 A.L.R. 385 (Austl. 1983); Waterford v. The Commonwealth, 61 Austl. L.J. Rep. 350 (Austl. 1987).
67. See F. GURRY, BREACH OF CONFIDENCE (1984) (describing the English law of
confidence); Humphers v. First Interstate Bank, 696 P.2d 527 (Or. 1985). Recently, the
"Spycatcher" case has aired the issue. In England see Attorney-General v. Guardian
Newspapers, 1 W.L.R. 1248 (H.L. 1987). In Australia, the British government brought
an action to suppress the publication of Spycatcher. The High Court of Australia refused
to give injunctive or other relief to the contract of confidentiality between the British
Crown and a member of the British Security Service. Attorney-General (U.K.) v. Heinemann Publishers Austl. Pty. Ltd., (No. 2), 62 Austl. L.J. Rep. 344 (1988). The House
of Lords clarified aspects of the action and remedies in GuardianNewspapers, 3 W.L.R.
776. For comment, see 48 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 1 (1989). The New South Wales Court of
Appeal found no grounds to suppress. Attorney-General (U.K.) v. Heinemann Publishers, Austl. Pty. Ltd., 10 N.S.W. L. Rep. 86 (1987). For an interesting comparative appraisal, see Lee, Bicentennial Bork, Tercentennial Spycatcher: Do the British Need a
Bill of Rights? 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 777 (1988).
68. See, e.g., Purcell, Rights in the Constitution: The Bill of Rights Revisited? 62
AUSTL. L.J. 268, 271 (1988); E. CAMPBELL & H. WHITMORE, FREEDOM IN AUSTRALIA 268-269 (1977); Curtis, Freedom of Information in Australia 14 FED. L. REV. 5

(1983).
69. See RESTRAINING LEVIATHAN: SMALL GOVERNMENT IN PRACTICE (M. James
ed. 1987) [hereinafter RESTRAINING LEVIATHAN].
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makes the argument more. difficult to win.70 Australians attach little
weight to the idea of liberty-perhaps because their liberty has never
been crushed by conquest."
When faced with the momentum built up against racial discrimination, the freedom of speech value seems like a weak reed on which to
rely. The next part will show that free speech is not so elusive, but
that-considering the fragility of the liberty-there is even more reason
to demand careful justification of its infringement."2 As a result, it is
essential to articulate the legitimate ambit of free speech in order to
gauge how far the legislature should proscribe racial defamation.
III.

A

GUIDING FRAMEWORK

A.

The Dilemma

The place of extremist defamatory racial speech in a society committed
to free speech has often seemed like an intractable conundrum. Those
with a case law mind may examine with reward the United States Supreme Court's attempts to draw the boundaries of free speech.7 3 The
Court has reserved some of its best rhetoric for the first amendment's
guarantee of free speech. 7"4 As impressive as this literature is, however, in
the end it fails to provide appropriate guidance on the issue of extremist
racial defamation.

70.

See, e.g., G. DE Q. WALKER, INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM: THE PEOPLE'S

LAW (1987).

71. R. TERRILL, THE AUSTRALIANS (1987).
72. For an excellent analysis, see H. Collins, Political Ideology in Australia: The
Distinctiveness of a Benthamite Society, 114 DAEDALUS 147 (Winter 1985).
73. It is noteworthy that non-United States courts have taken note of United States
first amendment jurisprudence, see Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers, Ltd.
(No. 2) 3 W.L.R. 776, 790 (H. L. 1988). United States treatments of free speech are
legion; see, e.g., D. TUCKER, LAW, LIBERALISM AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1985); F.
SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY (1982); F. BERGER, FREEDOM
(1980); J. BARRON & C. DIENES, HANDBOOK OF FREE SPEECH AND
FREE PRESS (1979); R. O'NEIL, FREE SPEECH: RESPONSIBLE COMMUNICATION UNDER
OF EXPRESSION

LAW (1966); T.
FENDED

SCHROEDER, CONSTITUTIONAL FREE SPEECH: DEFINED AND

(1970); N.

DE-

CAPALDI, CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER: THE FREE SPEECH CON-

(1969); A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
POWERS OF THE PEOPLE (1960); M. KONvrrz, FUNDAMENTAL LIBERTIES OF A FREE
TROVERSY

PEOPLE: RELIGION, SPEECH, PRESS, ASSEMBLY

(1957); see generally Greenawalt, Free

Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 119 (1989).
74. Justices Holmes, Brandeis, and, more recently, Brennan have been particularly
successful in lending inspiration to the work of the first amendment. Some may say that
this is the reverse of what was said by Mark Twain of Wagner's music that "it is better
than it sounds."
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In Beauharnaisv. Illinois,75 the United States Supreme Court was
required to pass on the constitutionality of a provision in the Illinois
Criminal Code. The provision made it unlawful for any person to publish material which, amongst other things, exposed "citizens, of any race,
color, creed or religion to contempt, derision, or obloquy. .. 76
Beauharnais had distributed a leaflet setting forth, in a rudely constructed prose, a petition calling on the Mayor and City of Chicago "to
halt the further encroachment, harassment and invasion of white people,
their property, neighborhoods and persons, by the Negro .... ,, It went
on to state that if "persuasion and the need to prevent the white race
from becoming mongrelized by the negro will not unite us, then the aggressions ... rapes, robberies, knives, guns and marijuana of the negro,
surely will. ' '7 8 With this preamble, persons were invited to join the
"White Circle League of America, Inc."
It was perhaps portentous that this decision followed closely on the
Second World War. Memories were fresh of the Nazi atrocities and of a
remarkable upsurgence of antisemitism in the United States in the war
years. 9 There was academic writing generally supporting legislative action.80 Against this background, the majority of the Court, in an opinion
delivered by Justice Frankfurter, upheld the constitutionality of the provision under which Beauharnais had been convicted.
Justice Frankfurter recited the "tragic experience of the last three decades" as support for the conclusion that "wilful purveyors of falsehood
concerning racial and religious groups promote strife and tend
powerfully to obstruct the manifold adjustments required for free, ordered life in a metropolitan, polyglot community."'" Illinois, because of
ructions experienced over a period, had a rational interest in enacting

75.
76.
ch. 38,
77.

343 U.S. 250 (1952).
Id. at 251 (quoting section 224 of the Illinois Criminal Code, ILL.
§ 471 (1949)).
Id. at 252.

Id.
79. See P. JOHNSON, A HISTORY

REV. STAT.,

78.

OF THE JEws 504 (1987) (There was "more antiSemitism during the war than at any time in American history.").
80. See Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Control of Group Libel, 42 COLuM.
L. REV. 727 (1942); Lasson, Group Libel Versus Free Speech: When Big Brother
Should Butt In, 23 DuQ. L. REV. 77 (1984). See also L. ELDREDGE, THE LAW or
DEFAMATION 54-64 (1978); Belton, The Control of Group Defamation: A Comparative
Study of Law and Its Limitations, 34 TUL. L. REV. 299 (1960); Beth, Group Libel and
Free Speech, 39 MINN. L. REV. 167 (1955); Donnelly, The Law of Defamation: Proposals for Reform, 33 MINN. L. REV. 609, 623-26 (1949); Tanenhaus, Group Libel, 35
CORNELL L.Q. 261 (1950).

81. Beauharnais,343 U.S. at 258-259.
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this kind of legislation.
The first amendment free speech issue was addressed only obliquely,
the argument resting upon the well-established state right to allow its
citizens to vindicate reputations via defamation law. If reputations are
inextricably tied to group or racial identity, the same right ought to sustain a group defamation statute. What is more, criminal libel, suitably
conditioned, was a fixed part of "Anglo-American law." 2 The statute in
Beauharnais, as the Illinois Supreme Court opined, was "a form of
criminal libel law.""3 These foundations of the argument, taken together
with the recitation of episodes of racial violence in order to ground the
state's interests in the legislation, were later to severely weaken the authority of Beauharnais. The case was decided in the pre-New York
Times v. Sullivan era, and it could be said that the Court therefore
neither took seriously enough free speech nor recognized the limits of
defamation law. 4 In addition, or alternatively, it could be said that the
reasoning relied upon words that threaten breach of the peace and fall
within the "fighting words" exception to the first amendment."5 The Supreme Court requires that the words must be likely to incite a person to
physical violence, 88 or to an unlawful act. The nexus to outbreaks of
violence or unlawfulness must be so close as to be imminent, and likely
87
to produce such action.
Time has eroded the foundations of Justice Frankfurter's majority

82. Id. at 263. Beauharnais' observations about criminal libel and its place under
the first amendment were expressly repudiated in Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64
(1964), decided a few months after New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)
had placed libel laws within first amendment coverage thus overruling Beauharnais.T.
EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 396 (1970).
83. 343 U.S. at 253.
84. Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1204-05 (7th Cir. 1970). The federal courts now
gladly ignore the decision. See Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith v. FCC, 403
F.2d 169, 174 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1968) ("[Far from spawning progeny, Beauharnaishas
been left more and more barren by subsequent First Amendment decisions, to the point
where it is now doubtful that the decision still represents the views of the Court"). See
also infra note 102.
85. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
86. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972); Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901
(1972) (vacated and remanded in light of Gooding v. Wilson); Brown v. Oklahoma, 408
U.S. 914 (1972) (vacated and remanded in light of Gooding v. Wilson); Lewis v. New
Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974).
87. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105
(1973); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Farber, Civilizing Public Discourse:

An Essay on ProfessorBickel, Justice Harlan and the Enduring Significance of Cohen
v. California, 1980 DUKE L.J. 283. Note also that the English courts have insisted upon
this immediacy by statute. See, e.g., Regina v. Howell, 1 Q.B. 416 (C.A. 1982).

448

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol 22.431

opinion. His underlying assumption that states ought to be given some
room in law reform-that the courts should not judge "the wisdom of
the legislation or ... its efficacy"""-while of contemporary moment, is
trumped by first amendment free speech notions.8 9 Instead, the certainties of the dissenters, Justices Black and Douglas, were victorious in the
battle of ideas concerning the first amendment. In retrospect, these are
predictable dissents, and they were repeated over the next two decades. 90
The most interesting of the dissents, albeit a neglected one, is that of
Justice Jackson, who had been Chief Counsel on the Nuremburg Trials. 0 ' On the one hand, he had close exposure to the destructive power of
racial defamation. On the other, he was a staunch supporter of free
speech. 2 The tension between his loathing of the result under the Nazi
regime and the imperatives of free speech is well articulated toward the
end of his opinion:
Group libel statutes represent a commendable desire to reduce sinister
abuses of our freedoms of expression-abuses which I have had occasion
to learn can tear apart a society, brutalize its dominant elements, and per-

88. Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 267. Justice Frankfurter's opinion also reflects his
philosophy of judicial self-restraint-a philosophy which was to lose ground in the Warren court. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
89. The Supreme Court, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), recognized the states' interest in protecting reputation under defamation law, and that they
could establish their own standard of liability provided that first amendment requirements ultimately ruled. Id. at 348.
90. The concurring opinions of Justices Black and Douglas are legend. This tandem,
while originally expressing the "absolutist's" dissent, would later more closely express
the prevailing opinion of the Court on matters of free speech. See, e.g., Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494, 579 (1951) (Black and Douglas dissenting); Yates v. United States,
354 U.S. 298, 339 (1957) (Black and Douglas concurring in part, dissenting in part);
Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 134 (1959) (Black and Douglas dissenting);
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969) (Black and Douglas concurring) (cases
concerning political speech). See also Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 508 (1957)
(Black and Douglas dissenting); Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 476 (1966)
(Black and Douglas dissenting); Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966) (Black and
Douglas dissenting) (cases concerning pornography and free press). See Freedman v.
Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 61 (1965) (Black and Douglas concurring) (free press extended
to motion pictures); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 293 (1964) (Black and
Douglas concurring) (free speech versus libel). See generally W. DOUGLAS, THE COURT
YEARS 103-110, 197-211 (1980); J. MAGEE, MR. JUSTICE BLACK: ABSOLUTIST ON THE
COURT 29-64 (1980); HUGO BLACK AND THE SUPREME COURT: A SYMPOSIUM 118122, 245-252 (S. Strickland ed. 1967).

91. See R.H. JACKSON, THE NORENBERG CASE (1947). See also
AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION 236 (expanded ed. 1988).

G.E. WHITE,

92. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 544 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring).

THE
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secute, even to extermination, its minorities. While laws or prosecutions
might not alleviate racial or sectarian hatreds and may even invest scoundrels with a specious martyrdom, I should be loath to foreclose the States
from a considerable latitude of experimentation in this field. Such efforts,
if properly applied, do not justify frenetic forebodings of crushed liberty.
But these acts present most difficult policy and technical problems...
No group interest in any particular prosecution should forget that the
shoe may be on the other foot in some prosecution tomorrow. In these, as
in other matters, our guiding spirit should be that each freedom is balanced with a responsibility, and every power of the State must be checked
with safeguards. Such is the spirit of our American law of criminal libel,
which concedes the power to the State, but only as a power restrained by
recognition of individual rights. I cannot escape the conclusion that as the
Act has been applied in this case it lost sight of the rights.93
Justice Jackson's argument was that the history of defamation law
and of criminal libel in particular exemplified an accommodation, with
ordered liberty preventing an invasion of free speech. 4 Protection of
speech through defenses of truth or fair comment was essential. 95
Needless to say, Justice Jackson's opinion has suffered the slings and
arrows of a Court imbued with the spirit of New York Times v. Sullivan.9" The balance struck by the common law in resolving the demands
of free speech and protection of reputation has been cast aside as not
affording a sufficient scope to free speech. But even though American
constitutional theory has bypassed much of the common law, Justice
Jackson's dissent provides some insights for others not tied to the American constitutional doctrine.
About a quarter of a century later the Neo-Nazis were planning a

93.
94.
95.

Beauharnais,343 U.S. at 304-05.
Id. at 295.
Id. at 300-61.

96. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
97. The details of the constitutional demands remain uncertain; New York Times v.
Sullivan was merely the beginning point. Supreme Court decisions that illuminate the
landscape are Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (the constitutional standard for non-public figures or officials); Curtis Publishing v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967);
(extending the actual malice requirement for public officials to public figures), Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 763 (1984) (the restrictive Gertz
rules on presumed and punitive damages do not apply to defamatory matters that "do not
involve matters of public concern"); Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767
(1986) (burden of proving the falsity of the defamatory statement is on the plaintiff
where a media defendant publishes material involving public officials or public figures as
matters of public concern).

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VoL 22:431

march on Skokie. The case law springing from this incident"8 shows how
far United States constitutional law has departed from Beauharnais.
The circumstances were notorious at the time, and have been widely
commented upon.99 Collin was the leader of the National Socialist Party
of America. That party's believers embraced the dogma that blacks are
biologically inferior to whites; that the former should be expatriated to
Africa as soon as possible; and that American Jews wield "inordinate..
. political and financial power" and stand in "the forefront of the international Communist revolution."1 ' Members donned the regalia of the
Third Reich. Collin and his party's members proposed to march in front
of the Village Hall of Skokie, a village near Chicago. The village has a
large Jewish population, including several thousand survivors of the
Nazi holocaust. The march elicited a number of actions in court. In
these actions, the courts were obliged to deal with the constitutionality of
village ordinances designed to prohibit, control, and penalize demonstrations of the type planned by Collin.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit considered Beauharnais,but read it down to accord with present day conceptions.10 1 In this vein, the Seventh Circuit expressed doubt that Beauharnais remains "good law at all after the constitutional libel cases."' 0 2
Other arguments were raised and rejected. The plaintiff, in particular,
submitted that the actions of Collin's cohorts would inflict psychic
trauma on the resident Holocaust survivors and upon other Jewish residents. The plaintiffs pointed to the recognized tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Seventh Circuit dealt narrowly with this

98. Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 915
(1978); Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party of America, 69 Ill. 2d 605, 373
N.E.2d 21 (1978); see also Note, A CommunitarianDefense of Group Libel Laws, 101
HARV. L. REV. 682 (1988).
99. *See, e.g., L. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND
EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA 12-42, 104-44, 175-212 (1986). See also A. NEIER,
DEFENDING

My

ENEMY

(1979).

100. 578 F.2d at 1199.
101. Id. at 1204-05.
102, Id. at 1205. The rhetoric of these cases must destroy Beauharnais,condemning
it to oblivion when next considered by the Supreme Court. Take the rhetorical force of
the oft repeated assertion in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974),
"[ulnder the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious
an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and
juries but on the competition of other ideas." For additional support questioning the
viability of the holding in Beauharnais,see, American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771
F.2d 323, 331 n.3 (7th Cir. 1985); R. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 4.10[3], at 48,
n.197 (1989).
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issue, indicating that criminalizing conduct was quite a different matter
from creation of tortious liability."0 3
The telling point for the plaintiffs was either not put, or not sufficiently apprehended, by the court. If the law is prepared to countenance
a restriction of free speech for tortious liability, why should it not for
criminal liability? The trammels on speech posed by tort liability may be
much greater than by criminal liability."0 For instance, punitive damages may be more draconian than criminal fines, which in Collin were
five to 500 dollars. Moreover, the safeguards for the individual of the
criminal law are more exacting than those pertaining to civil law.'
The Seventh Circuit in Collin dilated upon another point worthy of
close thought. One provision in the Skokie ordinance gave the "officials
the power to deny use of a forum in advance of actual expression." 10
The court opposed any power of prior restraint, finding a "heavy presumption" against its constitutionality: "a free society prefers to punish
the few who abuse rights of speech after they break the law than to
throttle them and all others beforehand."' 7 But prior restraint is a concern not only of the first amendment; the common law of defamation is
also loath to grant an injunction to prevent the publication of defamatory
matter. Like the American constitutional position, the common law has
its own presumption favoring vigorous competition of ideas.' 0 8 The difference is that American courts have come to believe that the possibility
of retrospective penalization by way of damages in defamation may
overly dissuade publishers from engaging in important public debate. In
consequence the forensic dice need to be loaded in favor of the publisher.'0 9

103.

Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d at 1205-06.

104. Cf New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277, 278 (1964) (recognizing
this very argument).
105. It is now clear, however, that the scope for state tort law imposing liability for

intentional infliction of emotional distress is severely truncated under the strictures of the
first amendment. The Supreme Court has recently examined the limits of the tort in
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).

106. 578 F.2d at 1207 (citing Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S.
546, 553 (1975)).
107. 578 F.2d at 1207 (quoting Conrad 420 U.S. at 558-59).
108. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). For a thorough study of the Near
case, see F. FRIENDLY, MINNESOTA RAG (1981).
109. Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986) is a recent example in
which the Supreme Court altered the burden of proof to improve the strategic position of
the media in defamation actions. See also Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, 695 F.2d 438 (10th

Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1132 (1983) (strengthening position of writers of fiction and "gonzo" journalism).
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It seems probable that the stance taken in Collin will prevail in American courts and that the unresolved issue on the limits of the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress will be decided in favor of free
speech where the speech may be dubbed political.110 Formally, however,
the dilemma continues, for the basic points made by Justices Frankfurter
and Jackson in Beauharnaishave never been answered.1 '
B.

Theoretical Foundations

The foregoing argument demands some firm theoretical mooring. This
will permit us to appreciate the amplitude of the freedom, and its corollary, how it may be confined.
Even the most absolute believer in freedom of speech admits that limits exist. Can a person, for no good reason, call, "Fire!" in a crowded
theater, or knowingly misstate facts in order to defraud, or maliciously
besmirch the reputation of another," 2 or, more problematically, promote
ideas destructive of fundamental institutions in an open society?... All

110. Hustler Magazine Inc., v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1987) Le Bel, Emotional Distress, The First Amendment and "This Kind of Speech": A Heretical Persepctive on
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 60 U. CoLo L. REv. 315 (1989). Non-political speech,
however, would not attract the same protection. See Weirum v. RKO General, Inc., 15
Cal.2d 40, 539 P.2d 36, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1975); Eimann v. Soldier of Fortune, Inc.,
680 F. Supp. 863 (S.D. Tex. 1988), rev'd, 880 F.2d 850 (5th Cir. 1984); Caswell,
Soldiers of Misfortune: Holding Media Defendants Liablefor the Effects of their Commercial Speech, 41 FED. CoMM. L.J. 217 (1989). But courts are not always willing to
make a distinction between political and non-political speech. See, e.g., Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, 814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1987).
111. See Note, Group Vilification Reconsidered, 89 YALE L.J. 308 (1979) (suggesting that the first amendment does not preclude legislation directed to the evil).
112. In these three instances the law of torts provides causes of action and remedies
for injuries sustained as a result of the tort. Negligent or intentional words causing physical harm are actionable. See, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 523 (1972) (insult
statutes, which entail a breach of the peace, do not violate free-speech provisions of the
first amendment). Strict liability may adhere when the words relate to products. See, e.g.,
Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932) (strict liability extended
to express statements as to quality made in advertising, sales materials, and representations). Deceit or fraudulent misrepresentation are actionable. See the foundation case of
Derry v. Peek, 14 C.A. 337 (1889). Defamation protects reputation; see R. SMOLLA,
supra note 102, § 1.06, at 1-15.
113. Ideas alone may be sacrosanct, but when ideas are action-producing the law has
responded. See Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444 (1969); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973); see also Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942). The traitor motivated by vehemently held
ideals cannot plead free speech when she engages in subversive activities, see Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 320-24
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are examples of where the law has been willing to restrict free speech.
Various perspectives are not lacking, but to view free speech from the
function it serves is the most common and enlightening approach."1 4
What social purposes are fulfilled by a commitment to free speech?
These social purposes have a critical connection with the democratic nature of our respective societies. In this way, our law, both common and
constitutional, has conceived that freedom of speech serves some public
interests of such weight that individual private interests must give
way." 5 The goal of any theory in this area is to help us identify the
public interests secured by free speech. My argument is that these "public interests" are concerned with the preservation of democratic rights.
Free speech nurtures two essential aspects of a liberal democratic society: moral pluralism and tolerance. In turn these aspects protect at base
the important normative and conceptually fundamental value of individual autonomy:" 6 a person's right to make free choices, to determine a
life plan to conform to his own conception of the good life, and to seek
truth. 7 The state has no right to impose its conception of the good on
its inhabitants."'
Political society-especially one that can be called a liberal democracy-exists to serve the interests of its members. The interest served by
free speech is the individual's interest of autonomy. The individual may
sacrifice a share of his personal interests at the altar of a society committed to free speech in order to secure his autonomy." 9 If this is accepted,
it follows that speech may be constrained when it invades the basic value
it was designed to protect. The law, however, is an imperfect tool by
which we can identify the stopping point.
I shall return to explicate this theory, but first I must traverse ground,

(1957).
114. See Schauer, Categories and the FirstAmendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34
VAND. L. REV. 265, 274 (1981) ("purpose-oriented" distinction).
115. See J. RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 179 (1986).
116. G. DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 32 (1988).
117. Id. at 398. The concept of autonomy has been invoked both to justify and damn
liberalism. See A. RAPACZYNSKI, NATURE AND POLITICS: LIBERALISM IN THE PHILOSOPHIES OF HOBBES, LOCKE, AND ROUSSEAU 239-48 (1986) (Rousseau's conception of

the autonomous man).
118. J. RAZ, supra note 115, at 108.
119. This is revealed most strongly in the contractarian scheme of liberal democracy
stemming from Hobbes, but modified in the hands of the economists, Adam Smith and
his intellectual progeny. See A. RAPACZYNSKI, supra note 117 (tying the intellectual
history); G. BRENNAN & J. BUCHANAN, THE REASON OF RULES (1985) (describing in
economic theory the function of legal rules); see generally J. Hampton, Hobbes and the
Social Contract Tradition (1986).
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the consideration of which has led me to my views.

C. A Traverse of the Territory
Most theories have blended, without punctilious attention to philosophical niceties, utilitarian, and rights-based theories. This seems natural, for J.S. Mill has always been the point of departure for theorists,
and his ideas possess an amalgam of the utilitarian and rights-based notions.1 20 Mill wished to place some constraint upon the kinds of harm
that government may seek to prevent. Hence, he eschewed the pure utilitarian balancing of his father and Jeremy Bentham. In a rule utilitarian
fashion,12 ' he reasoned that more good, in the long run, was likely to
come from placing fetters upon government. 22 A happy example of this
philosophy recognizes free speech:
All who are on a level with their age now readily admit that government
ought not to interdict men from publishing their opinions, pursuing their
employments, or buying and selling their goods, in whatever place or
manner they deem the most advantageous. Beyond suppressing force and
fraud, governments can seldom, without doing more harm than good, attempt to chain up the free agency of individuals.' 2 3
His focus was the individual and the individual's capacity to choose life
patterns for himself. His preeminent faith resided in the reasoning and
intellectual powers of the individual, and found its place in the harm
principle:
[T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to
others.... He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it
will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier,1 24because,
in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise or even right.
120.

See, e.g., J.S.

TIVE GOVERNMENT

MILL, ON LIBERTY AND CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTA-

(G. Himmelfarb ed. 1974).

121. See J.J.C. SMART & B. WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST 7278 (1973).
122. See J.S. MILL, supra note 120, at 180-83. Cf. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (J.
Madison), reprinted in THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: A DocuMENTARY HISTORY 203 (M. Kammen ed. 1986) (a similar suspicion of government was
central to Madison's rationale for the limitation of governmental powers).
123. J.S. MILL, ESSAYS OF POLITICS & CULTURE 177 (G. Himmelfarb ed. 1962).
124. J.S. MILL, supra note 120, at 68. The political and economic analysis of industrialized Britain also spawned a suspicion of government from an unlikely quarter. The

current scholarship on Marx's early manuscripts demonstrates his concern with unfettered governmental authority "eliminat[ing] talent, etc. by force . . . which negates the
personality of man in every sphere." See K. MARX, Private Property and Communism
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An individual has a realm of private life where the public may not
enter.125 Not only are the interests of the individual protected, but so too
are society's, since the public weal is promoted through the participation
of autonomous individuals in society. The autonomous life has two distinct features often not clearly differentiated: the first is the individual's
private realm; the second is the individual's capacity to make choices
directed to this own conception of the good life.126 Part and parcel of the
latter is the commonly identified element of autonomy-the freedom of
the individual to exercise his faculties in a search for truth and fulfillment, 27 and although often not socially adhered to, "its influence is the
main determining cause of the social progress. 1 2 Truth-seeking is essential to informed decisionmaking, as is well-recognized in the law of
informed consent, where the doctor has a duty to convey the risks of a
therapy to the patient.12 This is what Thomas Scanlon had in mind
when he said that the autonomous person must "see himself as sovereign
in deciding what to believe and in weighing competing reasons for action."' 30 Scanlon would limit government's ability to restrict liberty to
prevent harm. Government may not prevent harm by "controlling people's sources of information to insure that they will maintain certain beliefs."' 3 1 When the individual is both a receiver and a conveyor of information, full autonomy demands that government neither repress
expression 132 nor muffle the source to limit its reception.' 3
Mill's arguments have deeply influenced this thesis on the free flow of
information. 34 Although modern day experience may warn of the dan-

in

MARX'S CONCEPT OF MAN

124-25 (E. Fromm ed. 1966).

125. See PUBLIC AND PRIVATE IN SOCIAL LIFE (S. Benn and G. Gaus, eds. 1983).
126. See G. DWORKIN, supra note 116.
127. See J.S. MILL, supra note 120, at 119-139 (of individuality, as one of the elements of well-being); Schauer, Free Speech and the Argumentfrom Democracy, 25 NoMOS 241 (1983).

128. J.S. MILL, A System of Logic, Book VI, in

COLLECTED WORKS OF JOHN STU-

VIII, 926 (1974).
Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. &

ART MILL,

129.
130.
PUB. AFF. 204, 215
(1972).
131. Id. at 222.
132. Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV.
964, 1000 (1978).
133. See also Scanlon, Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression, 40 U.
PITT. L. REV. 519, 524-27 (1979).
134. "A popular Government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both. Knowledge will
forever govern ignorance: And a people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm
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gers of an avalanche of information as benumbing autonomy, it is difficult to conclude that the government has a legitimate role in censoring
political speech. Individuals through private choice will devise strategies
to handle information,' 35 and thus avoid the dangers of a surfeit of
information.
Holmes was influenced by Mill but added his own gloss of moral relativism which led him to fashion a province for free speech more extensive
than Mill's.1 3 Holmes's essential, if dismal, point can be put succinctly:
The harm principle has the capacity of undermining free speech when,
as is inevitable, a human institution is charged with weighing the harm
justifying the government intervention. Holmes's instincts made him suspicious of moral absolutes; certainly no human could determine absolute
truth. 137 At best, one could depend upon a mechanism of an objective
kind-and the invisible hand of the market was an appealing paradigm." 8 This concept, too, has had staying power. It comports with the
Madisonian minimalist state theory, where the state should act as the
facilitator of private arrangements and establish conditions conducive to
3
the free play of the market.1

9

themselves with the power knowledge gives." 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON
103 (G. Hunt ed. 1910).

135. See Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7
1 (1978); Hirshleifer, The Private and Social Value of Information
and the Reward to Inventive Activity, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 561 (1971); A. SPENCE,
J. LEGAL STUD.

MARKET SIGNALING (1974).
136. Holmes' classic dissent in Abrams provides ample evidence of his intellectual
ties to Mill. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919). However, Holmes'
skepticism and penchant for Social Darwinism prevented his position from merely echoing that of Mill's. See Lahav, Holmes and Brandeis:Libertarianand RepublicanJustificationsfor Free Speech, 4 J.L. & POL. 454-58 (1988). Holmes' market-place of ideas
ensured majority rule-including majoritarian repression of minority rights when the
latter could be reasonably said to subvert majoritarian social goals-not individual development. See G.E. White, supra note 91, at 158, 175. See generally Grey, Holmes and
Legal Pragmatism,41 STAN. L. REV. 787 (1989); Bloustein, Holmes: His FirstAmendment Theory and His PragmatistBent, 40 RUTGERS L. REV. 283 (1988).

137.

E.

PURCELL, THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY

209 (1973).

138. This powerful paradigm recurs in first amendment jurisprudence. See Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986), Smolla, Dun & Bradstreet, Hepps,

and Liberty Lobby: A New Analytic Primer on the Future Course of Defamation, 75
GEO. L.J. 1519, 1530 (1987).
139. See Bork, Neutral Principlesand Some First Amendment Problems, 47 INDIANA L.J. 1 (1971). For a sustained argument about the need for imposing constraining
rules upon political action, see G. BRENNAN & J. BUCHANAN, supra note 119. For a

discussion of the nature of these rules in a democracy, see J.
MORALS, AND THE LAW 290-310 (1988).

COLEMAN, MARKETS,
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Complementary to this-and also based upon Holmes's skepticism-one may discern another theory, which Dean Bollinger calls the
"Fortress Model."' 4 ° This thesis takes as its premise that allowing governments to control for the good permits government to control for the
bad; truth is so relative in time and social condition that its definition
must be vague. It follows that desirable regulation may overreach and
become repressive. Albeit tenebrous, this view appeals especially to the
sardonic Australian temperament. However, this purely relativist stance
provides no foundation for any limits to speech. It allows the most vicious and destructive of views to rank equally beside other views, even
though the former views would destroy the fabric of society and its capacity to create conditions for the exercise of free speech. 4 ' To take an
absolutely relativist position where all values are in flux is to say that
freedom of speech itself may not attract any protection in the face of
other values.'

42

The Fortress Model turns its suspicious eye on government. To be
sure, government-even well-intentioned-has a great potential to invade the liberty of the individual. It follows that a heavy burden of justification is required when government acts through legislation to restrict
freedom of speech. 43 But one of the weaknesses of free speech analysis
44
has been a singular concentration upon government as the villain.
This is unfortunate for two reasons. In the first place, it is not only the
government and its officials, but also, and more significantly, the majority-through legal and extra-legal means" 5-that may thwart the exercise of free speech. 46 But if this is our present day concern, it erodes
support for the influential functional or utilitarian theory that free
speech supports, and is justified by, the operation of a liberal democracy.
This theory has profoundly influenced the United States Supreme
140. L.
141.

BOLLINGER,

1 K. POPPER,

142. See R.

supra note 99, at 76-103.
THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES

DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 373

265-66 (5th ed. 1966).

(1986) (similar argument and "external

skepticism").
143. Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 787-88 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).

144. See, e.g., A. Meiklejohn, Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government, in
POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE (1965)

(concen-

trating on governmental interference).
145. See L. BOLLINGER, supra note 99, at 110.
146. This is by no means a new idea. See A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA 12 (R. Heffner ed. 1956); J.S. MILL, supra note 120, at 31; F. SCHAUER,
supra note 73, at 45 (citing a letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, in which
Jefferson quoted Horace, Odes, book III, ode iii "Civium arderprava;jbentium or 'the
frenzy of the citizens bidding what is wrong').
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Court's first amendment jurisprudence. Although the halcyon days of the
theory would be ushered in by New York Times v. Sullivan, Justice
Brandeis in Whitney v. Californiawas a harbinger:
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State
was to make men free to develop their faculties; and that in its government
the deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary .... They believed
that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means
indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth;. . . that the
greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a
political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of Ameri147
can government.
I take it that a central tenet of democracy is majority rule. 4" If the
majority decides to suppress free speech, how can it be defended upon
democratic lines? No doubt democracy is more than rule by the majority.
Yet, if liberal democratic theory legitimately places fetters on the majority in order to promote democratic values, may it not be that it is justifiable to place fetters on the exercise of freedom of speech, if the purpose
for those fetters is to promote those democratic values? If minorities 4 9
are given special protections in democratic theory, then laws preventing
erosion of those minority rights may legitimately infringe freedom of
speech as a consequence.' 5" For example, to prohibit racial defamation
may be justifiable as protecting the democratic rights of minorities. 5 '
At this point, the democracy argument-usually associated with
Meiklejohn-may beat a retreat to Holmes's fortress and the market of
ideas. The argument is this: To permit restrictions will lead to others.
Jews may support the right of the Neo-Nazi members to stage the Skokie march, on the basis that the very right asserted by the Neo-Nazis
affords them a right later to fight back in words or symbolic speech." 2
The retreat is futile because it idealizes our complex society. What suf147.
148.
149.
150.
152-53
151.
tection

274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
J.H. ELY, supra note 29, at 7.
The definition of "minority" is problematic. See id. at 149-179.
Cf. R. DWORKIN, supra note 142, at 377; see also J.H. ELY, supra note 29, at
(referring to United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938)).
R. DWORKIN, supra note 142, at 382-87. For a discussion extending the proagainst defamation to the civil rights of women opposing the depiction of women

in pornography, see Finley, The Nature of Domination and the Nature of Women: Reflections on Feminism Unmodified, 82 Nw. U.L. REv. 352, 355 (1988) (a review essay
of MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987)); see also Matsuda, Public Response to
Racist Speech: Consideringthe Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2320 (the "outside"
perspective).
152. L. BOLLINGER, supra note 99, at 98-100.

1989]

RACIALLY DEFAMATORY SPEECH

fices in a New England town meeting fails where powerful media operate with highly passionate and volatile public opinion. 15 3 The ideal
would smooth over this objection by submitting that in the long run, the
market will prevail-that truth will win out. But as Lord Keynes said,
in the long run we are all dead, and the costs will have been considerable-perhaps devastating-for democratic societies. The realities of contemporary public debate are far removed from the origin of the paradigm, the Baconian insight that "truth comes more easily out of error
than confusion, but it is also a tribute to the moral qualities of earnestness, scrupulousness, and honesty that are essential to the proper understanding of any difficult matter."' 54 This contemplative intellectual endeavor, the root of Mill's ideas, is out of place in the mendacious present
day world of the media.
Furthermore, to view the government as villain is to ignore the capacity of the government as a speaker to moral matters. Government actions
carry the imprimatur of authority. Silence and action carry social
messages. This sits at the base of much anti-discrimination legislation.
For government to speak provides not only a greater power to rectify
wrongs but carries a moral message that discriminatory behavior does
not have a place in that society. The commitment of the welfare state to
the provision of certain services is a manifestation of this moral role.
This is a reason why an impersonal market is often eschewed in favor of
less efficient government services. It is certainly plain that the moral role
of government in race relations has been strongly asserted in the years
since the Second World War.' 5 5 This is no warrant to accept the claims
of government but simply to recognize its positive, non-villainous role.
D. Bollinger's Tolerance
In his book, The Tolerant Society," 6 Dean Bollinger employs the dilemmas posed by extremist speech to explicate a new theory of free
speech, finding shortcomings in the existing theories. He fastens on toler-

153. Indeed, critical legal scholars criticize the law for failing to account for powerful
publishers' dominance in information dissemination. See A. HUTCHINSON, DWELLING
ON THE THRESHOLD: CRITICAL ESSAYS ON MODERN LEGAL THOUGHT 175 (1988).
"American soil is not the rich loam of freedom, but the cloying mud of privilege." Id. at
180.
154. Edwards, Toleration and Mill's Liberty of Thought and Discussion, in JUSTIFYING TOLERATION 106-107 (S. Mendus ed. 1988) [hereinafter JUSTIFYING TOLERATION].

155.
156.

See supra Part II, section C.
L. BOLLINGER, supra note 99, at 43-144.
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ance as the central support for free speech. 157 Under the other theories,
tolerance was but an incident to free speech. But tolerance becomes,
within Bollinger's framework, a central value that if accepted by the individual works through to the public culture of a society: "[T]he operation of free speech may be seen as reflecting a determination to create a
general intellectual character through the creation of a kind of tolerance
'
ethic."158
Bollinger argues that this general public culture will defuse
most harmful speech. It is conceded, however, that speech may be socially destructive, and the possibility of its correction or amelioration attenuated. Yet the law should be slow to proscribe this speech, for it may
be that it enhances tolerance. The march on Skokie may have had such a
positive benefit, for to allow the march would induce feelings of tolerance
that overall have a civilizing influence on the public culture. This it does
by confronting individuals with their innermost feelings about these matters and forcing them to examine why they should wish persons carrying
out the attacks to be punished by legal or nonlegal means."'
This theory shares some of the flaws of theories that Bollinger attacks.
Although he recognizes the dark side of the mind, he idealizes the individual and the public. The fact is that individuals are influenced by racist speech that is not necessarily offset by the opportunity to reflect upon
it or weigh it with other information, whether derived from within one's
psyche or from the outside. It is chimerical to conceive that a sufficient
number of individuals will intellectualize these matters in this way so as
to cultivate a public culture of self-restraint. No doubt we have all had
the feelings described by Bollinger. And perhaps to contemplate extremist speech helps us exorcise the devil. However, it seems entirely possible
that extremist speech may embolden the devil. To allow extremist speech
is symbolic of a public culture of self-restraint-albeit beset by hideous
intolerance at the extremities-but, to the attacked minority groups, it is
also symbolic of a feckless society, one that permits divisions and breeds
alienation.
When discussing symbols, one should not forget that governmental actions carry great symbolic weight. This, as stated previously, is a reason
why legislation against racial discrimination, although often unwieldy
and ineffectual, still carries a moral weight from its very enactment and

157. Id. at 134-137.
158.

Id. at 123-124.

159.

Id. at 127. But see Raz, Autonomy, Toleration and the Harm Principle, in

JUSTIFYING TOLERATION, supra note 154, at 169 (articulating reasons for allowing evil
or repugnant options, but rejecting them as "rarely" reducing "a person's choice sufficiently to affect his autonomy").
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presence on the statute books. It is important that the present-day issue
has arisen in those democracies with increasingly complex multi-racial
societies. For example, the National Front in Britain flourished only
when British society became less homogeneous-a result of the immigration of significant numbers of blacks from the Caribbean and Indians
and Pakistanis."' ° The dynamics of groups in society are ignored by an
overconcentration on the individual.' To tolerate extremist speech may
lead to perceptions of impotence and inadequacy in those groups. The
harm of this alienation is unlikely to be offset by benefits of tolerance on
an individual psychological plane."6 2
One aspect of American public culture may mitigate this dispiriting of
traduced racial groups. Such is the faith in private individual initiative
and the commensurate wariness of public action, that lack of governmental action may not be seen as a social abandonment. This faith and wariness have substantially eroded since the 1950s.'3 Expectations among
racial minorities are more Benthamite; such has been the great endeavor
of the civil rights movement. 4 This is exemplified by affirmative action,
representing government action that would be completely unacceptable
elsewhere.' And so in this area, despite a rear-guard neo-conservative

160.

THE BRIXTON DISORDERS,

supra note 14, at 8.

161. I do not propose recognition of group rights but note that individual rights may
depend upon group identity. See R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 13 (1985); Garet, Communality and Existence: The
Rights of Groups, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1001 (1983). This is, however, a matter of considerable moment. See P. FRENCH, COLLECTIVE AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY (1984);
L. MAY, THE MORALITY OF GROUPS: COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY, GROUP-BASED
HARM AND CORPORATE RIGHTS (1987) (Soundings: A Series on Ethics, Economics and

Business No. 1).
162. Not all defenders of free speech have defended toleration. Of Milton, Fish has
asserted that toleration was merely a step to a future "till we come to beatific vision." See
Fish, Unger and Milton, 1988 DUKE L.J. 975, 979 (quote is from J. MILTON, Are-

opagitica, in

COMPLETE POEMS AND MAJOR PROSE

741 (M. Hughes ed. 1957)).

163. Nowadays government is looked to to solve social problems-leading to a crisis
of faith in government as demand for social problem-solving outstrips government capacity. T. HALLIDAY, BEYOND MONOPOLY: LAWYERS, STATE CRISIS, AND PROFESSIONAL
EMPOWERMENT 36 (1987). This disjunction between popular demand and institutional
capacity erodes public confidence and leads to "democratic distemper." Id. at 13 (citing
Huntington, The DemocraticDistemper, 16 PUB. INTEREST 9 (1975)).
164. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) was the watershed.
165. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (upholding a 10% set-aside program for minority owned businesses). However, the use of racial classifications, even if
sometimes justifiable for the benign purposes of affirmative action, does not presently sit
well with the Court's new consensus that all racial classifications are suspect. See Regents of Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (invalidating the university's set-
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reaction, 6' the supporters of governmental intrusion, for better or for
worse, have won the day. The fat, the short, and the ugly may all suffer
unfocused defamation, but not for one moment do we treat these matters
6
as we do race..

7

E. Liberal Theory
The foregoing theories, gnarled as they are, have drawn upon ideas
deeply imbedded in Western democratic thought and legal tradition."6 '
The combined force of the theories is to give a firm place to free speech.
Each theory gives a powerful reason why any restriction on that freedom
must be closely justified.
In my view, a durable theory (or combination of theories) may only be
fashioned upon a theory of liberal democracy. The commitment of liberal
democracies is to afford their citizens the opportunity to live full autonomous lives. Within this is the value of equal concern and respect for
individuals. Combining this value with the harm principle, it may be
said that a fundamental value is the equal moral agency of every person
to pursue his own conception of the good, provided he does not harm
others.'6 9
As mentioned at the outset, free speech serves the public interest by
protecting the autonomy of individuals. But any society governed by laws
restricts the liberties of its members; one person cannot exercise his au-

aside quotas for minority medical school applicants); see also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of
Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (holding "societal" discrimination insufficient to validate a
set-aside program); City of Richmond v. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989) (invalidating
a 30% set-aside for minority owned businesses).
166. See P. STEINFELS, THE NEo-CONSERVATIVES (1979). Nathan Glazer argues
that affirmative action abandons the first principle of a liberal society that public policy
should take account of individual rights and welfare without consideration of group
membership. See N. GLAZER, AFFIRMATIVE DISCRIMINATION 220-21 (P975). Alan
Goldman, though presenting a more even-handed treatment than Glazer, similarly restricts the justification of affirmative action programs to create equal opportunity for the
chronically poor or to compensate those who were unjustly denied deserved positions in
the past. See A. GOLDMAN, JUSTICE AND REVERSE DISCRIMINATION 230-31 (1979).
For the Supreme Court's current restriction of affirmative action to those cases of past
discrimination against specific individuals, see Note supra note 165. See generally K.
GREENAWALT, DISCRIMINATION AND REVERSE DISCRIMINATION (1983).

167.

Some may say this is an obsession. Nevertheless, it is a contemporary social fact.

Cf. Note, supra note 98, at 693 (differentiating between "instrumental" (acquired or
earned) and "constitutive" (innate) group affiliations).
168. See H. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN
LEGAL TRADITION 1-18 (1983).
169. The author thanks Dr. Wojciech Sadurski for suggesting this formulation.
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tonomy in a way that destroys the autonomy of others. Free speechenhancing tolerance and pluralism-promotes the conditions under
which individual autonomy can be exercised without unduly trespassing.
But free speech exercise may also eclipse those values.1 7 0 Accordingly, a
society of laws should attempt to draw limits,11 even while recognizing
the powerful side-constraint or presumption in favor of free speech.
One's life choices and ability to act as an equal moral agent may be
intimately tied to a racial or ethnic group or minority in society. Indeed,
for any person, choice-making takes place in a social context. Joseph
Raz has said that the state may "prevent extreme cases where severely
offending or hurting another's feelings interferes with or diminishes that
1 72
person's ability to lead a normal autonomous life in the community.1
The autonomous life of a person associating with a racial minority is
diminished by racial defamation because his ability to enjoy pride in
membership is diminished.17 1 Justice Frankfurter cogently made the
point in Beauharnais: "[A] man's job and his educational opportunities
and the dignity accorded to him may depend as much on the reputation
of the racial and religious group to which he willy-nilly belongs, as on
his own merits. 1

74

The vital connection here is between the autonomous

life and the society in which it is lived. 75
The approaches to protecting the autonomous life vary among liberal
democracies. The United States heritage, manifested strongly in recent
years, is to distrust the state acting on the harm principle. At best, an

170. It is similar to the often discussed dilemma of a man exercising his freedom to
sell himself into slavery. Exercise of freedom and toleration finds its limit where the acts
contravene the principle of respect for persons. In Kantian terms the limit is the categorical imperative that human beings are ends in themselves and not means. I. KANT,
Groundworkfor the Metaphysics of Morals in THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE 165 (H.
Patton ed. 1967) ("So act as to use humanity, both in your own person and in the person
of every other, always at the same time as an end, never simply as a means"). For
discussion, see D.D. RAPHAEL, The Intolerable, in JUSTIFYING TOLERATION, supra
note 154, at 138-139.

171.

F.

SCHAUER,

UTOPIA 28-33

supra note 73, at 7-8 (citing R.

NozIcK, ANARCHY, STATE AND

(1974)).

172. J. RAZ, supra note 115, at 254; see also Note, supra note 98. But see Guest,
103 L.Q. Rev. 642 (1987) (reviewing J. RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986)).
173. See J. RAZ, supra note 115.
174. Beuharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 263 (1952).
175. Community values are compatible with the cultivation of the autonomous person. The autonomous person may have concern or respect for others in the group or
society or, I add, other groups in the society, and still be autonomous. This avoids having
to abandon an individualistic stance in order to inject wider community based values. See
S. BENN, A THEORY OF FREEDOM 213-235 (1988).
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objective market is the best protector-for reasons well articulated by
Holmes.' 7 6 This tradition, embodied in the Constitution, derives from
eighteenth century ideas. Suspicion of overreaching government has always been the watchword, together with "a romantic faith in human
perfectibility"-an "explosive blending of Jeffersonian rationalism with
democratic optimism.'

1

7

Elsewhere, in the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth, the public culture is dominated more by ideas of nineteenth century origin.' 7 8
The utilitarian ideas of Jeremy Bentham and of John Austin encouraged
a greater faith in the efficacy of the state's intervention.' 79 Government
may be harnessed more actively, in this view, to promote conditions for
individual autonomy.1 80 It follows that when this freedom is cherished
and is threatened by racist propaganda, the state may act. But freedom
of speech is such an essential condition for individual autonomy that the
greatest of care is demanded to avoid governmental overreaching and
hence erosion of individual autonomy itself.
Varying public cultures, then, will result in varying points of prohibition along the continuum between freedom of speech and racist defamation. The American approach gives more ample room for exercise of free
speech-the British, including some Commonwealth countries, less.' 81
The force of the free speech presumption is viewed differently. But
this is not to say that free speech is a relative value. The value remains;
it is simply a matter of strategy in these societies of how that value will

176. See G.E.

WHITE,

supra note 91, at 158, 175; see also Abrams v. United States,

250 U.S. 616, 630-631 (1919).
177. C. BOLT & S. DRESCHER,

ANTI-SLAVERY, RELIGION AND REFORM

2 (1980)

(Introduction).
178. ATIYAH, supra note 6, at 240-242 ("From the time of Bentham & Austin,
English lawyers and jurists increasingly subscribed implicitly, if not explicitly, to many

of their leading tenets").
179. Id. at 242. For Bentham's work,

see JEREMY BENTHAM AND THE LAw

Keeton & G. Schwarzenberger eds. 1948). For Austin's work, see J.
PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (Library
summation, see W. L. MORISON, JOHN AUSTIN (1982).

180.

L.

HUME,BENTHAM AND BUREAUCRACY

ESSAYS ON POLITICS AND CULTURE

AUSTIN,

(G.
THE

of Ideas ed. 1954); and for a

209-237 (1981). But see J.S. MILL,

120-125 (G.Himmelfarb ed. 1962) (chastizing

Bentham for not providing for such a harness in his majoritarian theories).
181. It should not be thought that public culture totally explains legal differences
between different countries. More prosaic explanations may be available, such as differ-

ences in procedure, for example financial incentives and other conditions governing litigation, see Prichard, A Systematic Approach to Comparative Law: The Effect of Cost,
Fee, and Financing Rules on the Development of the Substantive Law, 17 J. LEGAL
STUD. 451

(1988).
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protect individual autonomy. Any point selected will be subject to severe
pressures. In particular, a populist sentiment may often be encountered
to prohibit speech that is unpopular or inconsistent with current social
mores. A principle of free speech must hold the line against these pressures. It may do so by requiring a compelling reason for any infringement of free speech and by protection of individual autonomy. However,
one state's determination of the balance may be inconsistent with another's. Yet, the democratic character of both may be equal. Those values cherished as democratic or just will change. Elusive as they are, they
will inform the public culture.
Public culture changes from time to time within a society. The notorious example is that when a nation is at war free speech is more readily
confined. s2 More subtly in the United States the point in the continuum
has shifted, to which the constitutionalization of defamation in New York
Times v. Sullivan'83 bears witness. Here the point shifted from one established under the common law to one favoring more vigorous speech in
political matters. It shifted from the private right of the individual to the
public right of political discussion."" Identifying the locus of the point,
with the ebb and flow of constitutional law, is in no wise easy. A strong
minority of the Supreme Court has in recent decisions given greater
weight to a person's reputation. 8 5 Some strategic changes in the court
could give pause to the impulse to favor free speech over reputation. It
may be that the torts of intentional infliction of emotional distress and
invasion of privacy may reveal fissures in the free speech monolith, although the Supreme Court in the Falwell case 8 6 recently invoked the

182. Free speech is not the only individual freedom to give way. See, e.g., Ex parte
Mitsuye Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943);
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); see also Fraenkel, War, Civil Liberties and the Supreme Court 1941-1946, 55 YALE L.J. 715 (1946).
183. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). But see R. Epstein, Was New York Times v. Sullivan
Wrong?, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 782 (1986).
184. Franklin & Bussel, The Plaintiffs Burden In Defamation: Awareness and
Falsity, 25 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 825 (1984); Lewis, Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, and Speech on Matters of
Public Concern: New Directions in FirstAmendment Defamation Law, 20 IND. L. REV.
767 (1987).
185. See, e.g., Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 780 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 91 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 774 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
186. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (deciding that the first
amendment rendered unconstitutional state tort law that would find a publisher liable for
intentional infliction of emotional distress in respect of a political parody of a public
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well-worn rhetoric of the market of ideas in rejecting the famous
preacher's claim for damages for intentional infliction of nervous shock.
This is a central concern for law reform in Australia. Measure must
be taken of the prevailing Australian public culture. Doubtless it has
shifted with the enactment of racial antidiscrimination laws, the rhetoric
of multi-culturalism, and the reality of a less homogeneous society.
These are forces that militate in favor of a shift toward the proscription
of racial defamation and highlight the futility of an "absolute" protection
187
of speech.

IV.
A.

THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT

The Frameworkfor Reform

So the harm principle allows the state to intervene, even in the most
libertarian of societies: in the United States, an individual's reputation
continues to be protected. And I have demonstrated that similarly good
reasons may be found for interference with speech promoting racial defamation. This, however, does little to solve the critical dilemma of crafting
a legal response to the phenomenon of racial defamation without encroaching upon and destroying legitimate free speech. Because this
speech is so often of a political nature, the issue is perplexing. For example, should scientific work exploring possible intellectual differences between the races fall foul of the proscription? Would debate about the
desirable mix of immigration be chilled by fear of liability?
Two governing premises emerge in charting the course between Charybdis and Scylla. The first, as stated above, is a recognition of the justifiability of the government's acting as a speaker on moral matters in
relation to racial defamation. Second, a governmental response must
choose an institution to deal with instances of racial defamation. The
courts should be chosen, and specialized agencies of the legislature or
executive eschewed. These two issues, now discussed, will later form the
framework of reform recommendations.
B.

The Government as Speaker

Much emphasis has been given over the years to the impotence of
anti-discrimination legislation. 88 The processes of the law are ponderous
figure. It is not clear how far the Court's reasoning would extend to political speech that
caused similar damage to non-political figures).
187. This is the approach adopted in Part IV, where I suggest that very cogent reasons must be given to restrict expression of opinion.
188.

See

D. BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL
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and not easily accessible to those suffering the wrongs that the legislation
was designed to prevent. This has spawned suggestions for strengthening
the legislation 8 9 and judicial responses that stretch doctrine to accommodate policy goals.' 90 The inability of the legislation to accord equal opportunity has prompted a move to affirmative action programs. 9 ' This
move reveals a nerve of faith in society's perfectability. Antidiscrimination legislation cannot be dismissed as a failure, however, simply because
we have fallen short of Nirvana. Its success should be seen, rather, in
terms of its speaking to citizens about the shape of a desirable society.
Antidiscrimination legislation is an example of the government's discourse about moral matters, and can be seen "as symbolizing the public
affirmation of social ideals and norms as well as a means of direct social
control."' 9 2 The legislature draws its authority from the majority; it may
mix a potent brew, in order to change public perceptions, by enacting
principled legislation and employing the courts to implement it. In our
respective democratic societies, the courts have a power-derived from
their symbolic stance as upholders of individual rights, as institutions
above the venal vicissitudes of politics, and as elaborators of the law-to
communicate, to persuade, and to appeal to the sensibilities of the populace and those occupying positions of power.' 93
Legislation on racial defamation comes directly within this tradition.
Hedged with protections for free speech, it will be ineffectual in bringing
to book more than a small minority of those citizens bent on disseminating racial defamation. In fact, the diversity and tolerance of society must
always contemplate such citizens, for draconian legislation will do little
to curb their nefarious activities. Moreover, to arm legislation with the
police powers necessary to bring these perpetrators to book not only sets

(1987); see also Delgado, Derrick Bell and the Ideology of Racial Reform: Will
We Ever Be Saved?, 97 YALE L.J. 923 (1988) (book review).
189. See Partlett, supra note 56, at 174. See also Tarnopolsky, The Iron Hand in
the Velvet Glove: Administration and Enforcement of Human Rights Legislation in
Canada, 46 CAN. B. REV. 565, 584 (1968).
190. Recent Supreme Court decisions of employment discrimination and proof of
causation took a broad view of causation to accommodate the eradication of racial discrimination in the workplace. See Belton, Causation in Employment Discrimination
Law, 34 WAYNE L. REV. 1235 (1988).
191. See supra notes 164, 165, 166 and accompanying text.
192. M. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW AND GOVERNMENT
JUSTICE

EXPRESSION IN AMERICA 193 (1983) (citing J. Gusfield, Moral Passage:The Symobolic
Process in Public Designations of Deviance, in LAW AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 308,
309 (L. Friedman & S. MacCaulay eds. 1969)).

193. The United States courts may have extended this power beyond its traditional
uses. See id. at 193-94.
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an impossible task, but, worse, it hazards the values encompassed by free
19 4
speech.
Legislation is governmental speech of the most potent kind.1 95 As government speech, it has the entire lawmaking and enforcing apparatus
behind it. This necessarily confronts the debate about the legitimacy of
the government speaking. In the most general sense, it would be absurd
to. restrain government from taking moral stances. It adopts positions
every day.19 More positively, as Professor Tribe says, the first amendment, presumably even on its most absolute interpretation, does not
mean that government must be ideologically "neutral." Nor does it "silence government's affirmation of national values," or prevent govern19 7
ment from "add[ing] its own voice to the many that it must tolerate.)
And as Justice Scalia has well said while on the D.C. Circuit, a rule
proscribing government speech would lead to the "strange conclusion
that it is permissible for the government to prohibit racial discrimination,
but not to criticize racial bias; to criminalize polygamy, but not to praise
the monogamous family; to make war on Hitler's Germany, but not to
denounce Nazism." 9 Despite protestations from a first amendment angle that government should be agnostic, this is impossible. 99 All we can
say is that government's speech should not interfere with, but rather cultivate, individual autonomy. Because government is a powerful, sometimes overwhelming, voice, great care should be taken to cabin its
exercise.

194. This argument is counterintuitive, for it is rarely heard that legislation should
lack powers to ensure its full implementation. But the symbolic function of legislation in
a government's moral discourse justifies this route, and in the long run balances the
concerns aired in this paper. See Texas v. Johnson, 109 S.Ct. 2533, 2542 (1989) (Brennan, J.) (majority contending government's symbolic speech may foster nonoffensive conduct by persuasion and example where criminal punishment would not be justified).
195. M. YUDOF, supra note 192, at 263. See also White, What Can a Lawyer
Learn from Literature?, 102 HARv. L. REv. 2014, 2047 (1989) (book review) (suggesting that statutes are a way that government may speak not merely to coerce but to
inspire through literary symbols-"law is not simply an instrument for achieving a certain distribution of items in the world, but a way of creating and sustaining a political
and ethical community").
196. Welch, supra note 22, at 542-49 (law and morality are thoroughly
intertwined).

197.

L.

TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITurIONAL LAW

588, 590 (1978). See also Texas

v. Johnson, 109 S.Ct. at 2546-47; id. at 2552 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
198. Block v. Meese, 793 F.2d 1303, 1313 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
199. Kamenshine, The First Amendment's Implied Political Establishment Clause,
67 CALIF. L. REV. 1104 (1979). The same conclusion is applicable to the free exercise
clause of the first amendment, Welch supra note 22.
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But it is not sufficient simply to leave the argument here. Government-in the defense of interests of tolerance, pluralism, and individual
autonomy-has a duty to speak on moral matters on behalf of those in
the society who are inarticulate. Government is then acting as a
facilitator for the expression of ideas, and it is difficult to attack the action from a free speech standpoint. As Yudof has said, the preservation
of democracy in modern society demands "a balance between communications from government and those addressed to it."2 00 He identifies a
"need for a consciously fostered pluralism in communications networks
that treats government neither as impotent observer nor as omnipotent
participant."'2' The legitimacy of governmental speech is enhanced if it
is the legislature that speaks through its constitutional channels, for this
is at the very foundation of democracy, and consonant with Meiklejohn's
argument for free speech as the preserver of democratic rights.2 ' 2
Many forces will oppose the publication of racial defamation; in our
tolerant societies, it elicits great social opprobrium. But reinforcement
may come from the organ of the majority, the legislature, which may
speak eloquently and symbolize a social commitment. Moreover, bigoted
interests often have a voice, magnified by modern media, vastly outweighing their real significance. The diversified, unorganized interests of
the majority are often not enunciated. Legislation may do the job of
speaking and disapproving of certain social activities. Moreover, the legislation-in addition to expressing government's position-may afford an
avenue for minority group opinion. Litigation and courts represent a
highly important vehicle in our society, not only for vindication of rights,
but also the expression of opinion.
This should not be taken to mean that the legislation should be unenforceable. It is not necessary that government be relegated to mere
speaker; government may seek to regulate. The regulation will be secondary, however, to the speaking function of government. Fustian claims
of great social change should be forsworn, lest the entire enterprise appear a sham. The strategy should be to justify the terms of the legislation
as a balance between free speech and the rights of racial or ethnic
groups. It should then be admitted that in a democratic society racial
defamation, like many harmful social practices, may be exposed for what
it is, sometimes sanctioned, but never eradicated.
The courts are essential in this process, and it is to this question that I

200.
201.
202.
THE

M. YUDOF, supra note 192, at 22.

Id.
A. MEIKLEJOHN,
PEOPLE 57-77 (1965).

POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWER OF
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now turn.
C.

The Common Law and the Courts

The courts, in fashioning the common law, have from earliest times
imposed necessary constraints on free speech.20 3 The common law protected elemental rights of bodily integrity, economic rights, and reputation, and it was impermissible to harm these rights through actions.
Speech stood on the same footing. Racial insults could amount to actionable defamation if they sufficiently identified the persons defamed.
The new tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress-a cause of
action with great free speech implications-may be harnessed to vindicate the rights of an aggrieved person.20 This tort, as with the privacy
tort, departs from and reaches beyond the protection of time-honored elemental interests. The interests protected by these torts, psychic well-being and privacy, are particularly susceptible to invasion by speech. So it
is that the courts by extension of tort will severely test the limits of the
Supreme Court's drive toward public democratic rights at the price of
private rights. Whether or not the balance finally established is appropriate, the debate is salutory. Indeed, it is probable that no balance will
be arrived at, for public culture is in constant flux. Process is here more
important than result. The reasoned elaboration of the courts allows an
airing of views and a constant renewal and self-examination.
Not all common-law courts have the same capacity to deal with these
redoubtable matters. The creativeness of American courts is to be con20 5
Comtrasted with the narrowness of British Commonwealth courts.

monwealth courts, without the inspiration of a bill of rights, infrequently
invoke free speech principles, although those principles may influence
sotto voce. This narrowness invites legislative creativity, as has happened

203. See 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 537-38
(1911) (in "local courts" of the 13th century defendants might allege that their words
were true-veritas non est defamatio; citing Select Pleas in Manorial Courts); see also
GATLEY ON LIBEL AND SLANDER §§ 866-67 (Special ed. 1982).

204. See Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets,
and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 (1982). Although the Supreme
Court's decision in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) will dampen initial
enthusiasm for the tort, the holding upon reflection may be quite narrow. See supra note

186; see also Treiger, ProtectingSatire Against Libel Claims: A New Reading of the
First Amendment's Opinion Privilege, 98 YALE L.J. 1215, 1224 (1989).
205. This is put in different ways by different writers. See, e.g., ATIYAH, supra note
6. The authors of that book see the division as between the "highly formal" English legal
system and the "highly substantive" American. This discussion is explicated in the entirety of the book.
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in the Commonwealth with relation to race matters. One may point to a
variety of reasons for differences in judicial creativity.20 6 Perhaps the
most important is the presence of constitutional rights. Not only are
courts in the United States accustomed to exercising a large measure of
judicial review, but they may develop the common law with the knowledge that constitutional protections will limit their inadvertent trampling
upon fundamental freedoms. In other words, a corrective device is built
in, and one hand need not know what the other is doing. Commonwealth
judges must exercise greater self-restraint; a common-law doctrine once
born is not so bridled. The cup is thus passed to the legislature where,
ironically, the potential is exacerbated for overreaching and, hence, unjustifiably inhibiting, free speech.2" 7
The United States courts underscore the capacity of courts to function
with superior institutional competence-bringing to light good reason to
bemoan the crabbed role of the courts in the Commonwealth.20 8 The
United States Supreme Court, for example, has reserved some of its outstanding jurisprudence for freedom of speech issues. This has established
a rich tradition in which to judge issues as they are presented. Additionally, the judicial process of publishing reasons for its judgments allows a
flexibility not available to other institutions if charged with these duties.
A court may adhere to broad principles which, in the narrow circumstances, may shock the conscience. The march on Skokie was despicable,
and a court may say so, while relying on broad principles to allow it to
proceed. 20 9 Also, the courts, because of their political weakness, may present less risk of overreaching,21 to the detriment of free speech. A court

206. Id. at 118 ("American courts of last resort [are] in general far more activist
than English courts . . . English courts are more formal in their approach than their
American counterparts"). For exploration of reasons and the differing rules of these
courts, see id. 118-156, 267-297.
207. Rutherglen, Theories of Free Speech, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 122
(1987) (reviewing E. BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1985)).
208. Some are very pessimistic about the role judges could play, BLACKSHIELD,
Judges and the Court System in LABOR AND THE CONSTITUTbON 1972-1975, at 105-13
(Evans ed. 1977).
209. In this way courts are unique political institutions because of their ability to
recognize differing values and beliefs and to say that they count even though another,
broader principle must be adhered to. This process avoids, as Dean Calabresi states it,
the "emargination" of groups in society; see G. CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 98-99.
210. See A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 23-29 (1962) (arguing that
the enduring principles of the constitution are best protected by the judiciary because of
the courts' isolation from the "sword" and the "purse"). But see J.H. ELY, supra note
29, at 43-104 (arguing that courts are better suited to reinforce the representational process, not "enduring values"). Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: No-
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must seek and retain moral capital. Courts are tolerant institutions used
to weighing contending arguments, 2 1 and this has much to commend
them when dealing with accommodation of rights; the dialectic is open.
Furthermore, courts may more accurately reflect a changing public
culture. This may seem paradoxical since the legislature is usually seen
as more responsive to the will of the people. However, in our societies,
public culture is often channeled into legal discourse in the context of a
particular dispute. Legislatures are relatively unwieldy beasts which,
through complex usages, reflect in the end a social equilibrium. Legislation moves in quantum jumps, while courts may tinker at the edges,
experiment, cajole, and move the law at a micro-level. The courts may
be seen as political agents2 12 that provide access for the weak and inarticulate at a lower cost than the legislature. The courts may be conceived as
mediating institutions which, like churches, families, corporations, and
universities, may enhance the individual autonomy values of a democratic society. 213 Last, courts assume a measure of continuity essential to
the society's well-being.21 4 This continuity reduces the uncertainty of the
future implications of a present reform. Exceptions to general principles,
like freedom of speech, may be appropriately confined and the fear of the
general erosion of "the principle diminished. Thus, the "slippery slope" is
less a formidable argument in restraining reform. 215 The courts will apply the rule of statutory construction that the legislation should not be
interpreted to depart from established common law. 21 6 Reform that
flouts established common-law mores in a way that is clear, and thus not
susceptible to appropriate construction, may be allowed to stand without
judicial ameliorization-hoisted on its own petard. The courts, as in
their construction of civil RICO, may thus strongly signal the undesirability of reform but remain institutionally scrupulous in deferring to the
legislature.21 7

mos and Narrative, 97 HARv. L. REV. 4 (1983) (denying the courts have a special
competence to protect enduring values). See generally Kronman, Alexander Bickel's Philosophy of Prudence, 94 YALE L.J. 1567 (1985).
211. Referred to as "reasoned elaboration" by White, The Evolution of Reasoned
Elaboration:JurisprudentialCriticism and Social Change, 59 VA. L. REV. 279 (1973).
212. Zacharias, The Politics of Torts, 95 YALE L.J. 698 (1986).
213. Cf R. NISBET, THE QUEST FOR COMMUNITY: A STUDY IN THE ETHICS OF
ORDER AND FREEDOM 50-74 (1953) (discussion of these institutions).
214. J. RAZ, supra note 115, at 260.
215. F. Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REV. 361 (1985).
216. See Pub. L. No. 91-452 § 848, 84 Stat. 959 (1970); see also Russello v. United
States, 464 U.S. 16, 20 (1983).

217. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 500 (1985); see also Ameri-
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D.

Conclusion

Free speech may be confined in a liberal democracy where the value of
individual autonomy is enhanced by its restraint-for example, where
individual autonomy may be intimately tied to a person's racial or ethnic
identity in society. While this gives license to confine speech in the interests of guarding racial and ethnic groups from vilification, it does not
indicate the extent of restriction. Here the ideas of Holmes, Meiklejohn,
and Bollinger should be weighed. Dangers of the slippery slope, a distrust of government, a faith in the competition of ideas in the political
arena, and an engendering of a tolerant mindset, while not entirely coherent, are matters of great moment in a liberal democracy. There is no
certain course to be charted between free speech and the proscription of
racial defamation. Prevailing public culture variously weighing the values at stake will yield differing results.
In these concerns, two matters have been accorded inadequate weight.
The first is the agency of government as speaker and the second is the
institution of the courts to give vent to competing ideas within its influential and intellectual discourse.
The sum of these observations leads to the conclusion that free speech
should be sacrificed only reluctantly, for very few restrictions on free
speech restore the individual autonomy thus forfeited. Notwithstanding
the legitimacy of government influence to curb racial defamation, the
presumption must still rest with free speech. As Professor Schauer puts
it, a "Free Speech Principle" means "that free speech is a good card to
hold. It does not mean that free speech is the ace of trumps."21 The
burden may be satisfied only by reference to government's speaker role,
supported by the symbolic commitment of legislation and in affording an
avenue of speech for defamed racial groups in the courts. The strategy to
be developed accommodates both of these elements.
V. AN ATTEMPTED RESOLUTION: THE DEBATE IN AUSTRALIA
A.

Proposalsfor Reform: Background and Resolution

The Racial Discrimination Act, 1975, as a bill contained a provision
proscribing incitement to racial hatred. The provision, designed to track
the requirements of Article 4 of the International Convention on the
can Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Haroco, Inc., 473 U.S. 606 (1985); H. J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 108 S.Ct. 1219 (1989) (Court rejects eighth circuit's narrowing of the RICO act to separate "schemes" and organized criminals acts-reaffirms
Sedima).
218. F. SCHAUER, supra note 73, at 9.
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Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, was stripped from
the legislation during its passage through Parliament by dint of an attack
based upon its capacity to invade free speech.219 The Australian Government, punctilious about the ratification of treaties, made a consequential
reservation to its ratification of the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, stating as grounds
free speech concerns.
The Commissioner for Community Relations was later brought
within the Human Rights Commission. A function of this Commission,
and the earlier Commissioner, is to receive complaints of racial discrimination as a precursor to its exercise of conciliation powers. In the process
it accumulated complaints of racial defamation, covering about one quarter of all complaints made.2 2 "The range [of complaints] extended from

219. The provisions in the Bill created a $5,000 penalty for 1) publication or distribution of written material; 2) television or radio broadcast; 3) public speech; that promoted ideas based on 1) alleged racial, national or ethnic superiority; 2) racial, national
or ethnic hatred. Racial Discrimination Bill, cl.28 (1975) (available from author). This
bill was passed by The House on April 15, 1975, but clause 28 was deleted by the
Senate in the version it passed on May 29, 1975. See Kelsey, A Radical Approach to the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 1 U. NEW S. WALES 56, 66 nn.54-55 (1975).
Article 4 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (1965) requires:
States Parties condemn all propaganda and all organizations which are based on
ideas or theories of superiority of one race or group of persons of one colour or
ethnic origin, or which attempt to justify or promote racial hatred and discrimination in any form, and undertake to adopt immediate and positive measures
designed to eradicate all incitement to, or acts of, such discrimination and, to this
end, with due regard to the principles embodied in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the rights expressly set forth in article 5 of this Convention,
inter alia:
(a) Shall declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based
on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all
acts of violence or incitement to such acts against any race or group of persons of
another colour or ethnic origin, and also the provision of any assistance to racist
activities, including the financing thereof;
(b) Shall declare illegal and prohibit organizations, and also organized and all
other propaganda activities, which promote and incite racial discrimination, and
shall recognize participation in such organizations or activities as an offence punishable by law;
(c) Shall not permit public authorities or public institutions, national or local, to
promote or incite racial discrimination.
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, art.
4 (1965), reprinted in 1975 Austl. Acts 365, 367.
220. HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, PROPOSAL FOR AMENDMENTS TO THE RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION ACT TO COVER INCITEMENT TO RACIAL HATRED AND RACIAL DEF-
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blatant and deliberate incitement to racial hatred . . . to unthinkingly

racist statements, proverbs and jokes in poor taste." 21
About a quarter of the complaints concerned comments directed toward Aborigines. The next largest group related to the English, closely
followed by the Asians. Particularly virulent attacks were focused upon
Jews. It is ironic that some complaints were registered by Australians
who considered that certain ethnic groups exhibiting superior feelings
had exercised an ethnocentricity.
The Commission's 1981-82 Report noting these complaints and the
lack of legal redress initiated research on the issue. 22 The report maintains that most "politico-judicial" systems comparable to the Australian-"British, New Zealand, Canadian"-possess legislation dealing
with racial defamation, and that the United States stands as the exception. The report hints at two bases for legislation-public order, and the
223
powerlessness of maligned groups to respond effectively.
The Commission engaged in a consultative process inviting submissions. Those supporting legislative action unsurprisingly came from those
groups that are the targets of attacks. The opponents were "almost invariably members of the majority culture of persons descended from English-speaking ancestors. 2 2 4 This may be seen to weaken the credibility

No. 7, at 2 (1984) [hereinafter PROPOSAL FOR AMENDMENTS].
221. Id. at 3. The Commission gave the following list of representative instances of
complaints:
(a) Offensive words: e.g. 'wog', 'Porn', 'Abo', 'Boong', 'black', 'yellow belly',
'nigger'.
AMATION, REP.

(b) Ethnicjokes: especially Irish jokes but also cartoons featuring money-grabbing
Jews, drunken Aborigines, etc.
(c) Stereotyping: e.g. articles on Mediterranean back, Italians and crime, Aboriginal unemployment-all dealing unsympathetically with the ethnic group involved
and implying (not necessarily intentionally) that every individual member is
involved.
(d) Reporting designed to aggravate tension: especially in relation to Aborigines
in rural areas and Asian migrants in towns.
(e) Reports of racist statements by politicians and prominent public figures: approximately six out of ten complaints against individuals concern prominent
figures who attract media attention or government officials who are in positions
where they have some power over members of the public.
(f) Denials of the reality of racial extermination campaigns during World War II
or of historical massacres of Aborigines.
(g) Claims that some racial groups are more animal than human.
Id. at 5-6.
222. 1 Human Rights Commission, Annual Report 1981-82, at 35 (1982).
223. Id. at 36.
224. PROPOSAL FOR AMENDMENTS, supra note 220, at 7.
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of the opponents. To be fair, however, the argument is not allowed to
rest there, and the Commission's Occasional Paper, the basis of the later
Report, gives serious attention to the free speech issue. The Paper
frames the issue in terms of legislation designed to foster freedom of opportunity-the right "of each individual to build his or her life and to
live in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance, understanding and respect."'225 From this it is put that two "goods" contend. The argument is
one "that counter-positions the good (of freedom of expression) and the
good (of freedom of opportunity), and places upon the well-meaning legislator the task of striking the kind of balance that has bedevilled democratic communities for millenia." 22' 6 The Commission recognizes the dif227
ficulties in protecting freedom of expression while preserving fair play.
Unfortunately, it leaves the question posed and never attempts to resolve
the dilemma. Instead, the dilemma declared, the Commission launches
into an analysis of comparative legislation, an appraisal of remedies, 223
educational dimensions,22 9 distinctions between group defamation and
incitement to racial hatred,2 30 and the "key" aspects of contemporary
legislation.231
In its conclusion, the Occasional Paper exhibits a faith in the efficacy
of governmental action in attaining the goal of giving targeted groups a
"fair go." '232 Unfortunately, this conclusion fails to address the issue of
whether the method of reaching this goal unduly curbs free speech. Nowhere is the danger of government overreaching apprehended, nor are
the limits of social engineering adequately stated. The "libertarian" ar2 33
gument of reliance upon the good judgment of the majority is noted
but not the point, put forth in Part III, that the government most clearly

225.

HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, INCITEMENT TO RACIAL HATRED ISSUES AND

ANALYSIS, OCC. PAPER No.

1, at 6 (1982), [hereinafter

INCITEMENT TO RACIAL HA-

TRED]. This notion is akin to the individual autonomy value dilated upon in Part II.

226. Id.
227. Id. at 11.
228, Id. at 13-14.
229. Id. at 15-16.
230. Id. at 16-18.
231. According to the Human Rights Commimssion, the seven key aspects of contemporary anti-incitement legislation would include: 1) defining the appropriate constituency of the law-who to protect; 2) defining the scope of proscribed actions; 3) clarifying
the range of consequences that will be listed as offenses under the law; 4) clarifying the
mens rea of the offense-possibly following Britain's experience and dropping the requirement of intent altogether; 5) defining the defenses; and 6) the sanctions; and lastly
7) adapting the legislation to the specific socio-political context of Australia. Id. at 19-29.
232. Id. at 28-29.
233. Id. at 11.
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represents the majority, and a liberal democracy may place a restraint on
government action for the protection of minorities. It is then not appreciated that a fundamental way to protect minorities is to afford individuals
a broad ambit of free speech.23 4
Nevertheless, the Commission's Paper and its subsequent Report are
instructive in airing opinions and conclusions about the nature and ambit
of possible legislation in this area. The final recommendation was that
the Racial Discrimination Act should be amended as follows:
(1) Incitement to racial hatred. A provision to make it unlawful for a
person publicly to utter or publish words or engage in conduct which,
having regard to all the circumstances, is likely to result in hatred, contempt or violence against a person or persons, or a group of persons, distinguished by race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin: this provision should be drafted so as to ensure that certain valid activities are not
brought within its scope, e.g. the publication or performance of bona fide
works of art; genuine academic discussion; news reporting of demonstrations against particular countries; or the serious and non-inflammatory
discussion of issues of public policy.
(2) Racial defamation. A provision to make it unlawful publicly to
threaten, insult or abuse an individual or group, or hold that individual or
group up to contempt or slander, by reason of race, colour, descent or
national or ethnic origin.
(3) Definition of publication. A definition clause to make it clear that
publication is to be taken in a very broad way to cover the print and
electronic media, sign boards, abusive telephone calls etc. and that both
the individual making the statement and, where publication implies endorsement, the publisher would be covered by the two provisions outlined
2 35

above.

Those provisions are discussed in the Commissioner's Report.23 6 Of particular note is that unlawfulness does not depend upon a showing of
intention, but rather is based upon the published material's impact.23 7
This follows current legislation in the United Kingdom and New Zea234. As enunciated in Part III, to reiterate briefly, a basic premise of a broad-ranging free speech freedom is to prevent government overreaching. Legislation for good may
be turned to the evil. Because the legislature is primarily an organ of the majority, minority groups should have a special aversion to restrictions. In the end, a competition in
ideas is the best guarantor of individual autonomy. This view, deeply embedded in
United States first amendment jurisprudence, cannot simply be sloughed off. As noted in
Part III, the view has its weaknesses-but these are insufficiently understood in the
Commission's Occasional Paper.
235.
236.
237.

PROPOSAL FOR AMENDMENTS,

Id. at 14-19.
Id. at 15.

supra note 220, at 14.
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land where proof of intention is dispensed with.238 The harshness of this
is ameliorated, it is contended, by the conciliation process activated by a
breach.2 39 The "unwitting offender can immediately explain and apologise where this is appropriate."2' 4 If this conciliation should fail, probably when a recalcitrant racist is involved, a court may grant an injunction or damages. 24 ' The avoidance of criminal sanctions, it is thought,
will allow room for the "publication or performance of bona fide works
of art; genuine academic discussion; straight media reporting events; and
the serious and non-inflammatory discussion of issues of public po'242
licy."
The Commission argued that the legislation, if accepted, will allow
Australia to remove its reservation to Article 4 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. 4 3
B.

The Impact of the Recommendations

The recommendations, as previously stated, have had little impact and
have not seen the light of legislative day. Political parties supporting the
recommendations gain little-but risk much-in terms of electoral success. Signs are, however, that the fires for change are to be restoked. The
Human Rights Commission, now the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, has begun to reconsider another initiative, and the
New South Wales Anti-Discrimination Board began internal work from
which a draft Bill has emerged. The changing political climate will dictate whether the reform suggestions will be revivified. Economic reforms
have dominated the political agenda over the last five years. The Australian people have shown little interest in wider social reform, as seen in
the overwhelming rejection of constitutional reform in the Referendum
held on September 3, 1988.244 When revivified, the basis for review will

238. Id.
239. Id. at 15-16.
240. Id. at 16.
241. Racial Discrimination Act No. 52 Austl. Acts § 25 (1975).
242. PROPOSAL FOR AMENDMENTS, supra note 220, at 18-19.
243. Id. at 20.

244. See Starke, The failure of the Bicentennial Referendum to Amend the Constitution, 3 September 1988, 62 AUSTL. L.J. 976-78 (1988). The proposed reforms were:
(1) To provide for four-year maximum terms for members of Federal
Parliament;
(2) To alter the Constitution to provide for fair and democratic parliamentary
elections throughout Australia;
(3) To alter the Constitution to recognize local government;
(4) To alter the Constitution to extend the right to trial by jury, to extend
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be the comprehensive work done by the Commission, covered in this
part.
The significant anti-discrimination legislation, both state and federal,
has had an effect on Australian views. This legislation was followed by a
serious attempt to address the plight of the Aboriginals. In an earlier
constitutional referendum of 1967, the Australian constitution was
amended to allow the Australian Parliament to enact law for the aboriginal race in any state.2 4 Governments both of the left and right have
endorsed significant reforms to grant Aboriginal land rights. 2" Ironically, the courts' refusal to find property rights vested in Aboriginals
galvanized the political process to implement land rights.24 7 Consolidating these changes, both Houses of the Australian Parliament at the
opening of the new Parliament House in 1988 adopted motions that acknowledged Aboriginal occupation of Australia prior to European settlement, affirmed the importance of their culture and heritage and restated
their entitlement, under the Constitution and laws of Australia, to selfmanagement and self-determination. The need for promotion of reconciliation and acknowledgement of their special place in Australia was
affirmed.2 4
At the same time, political parties recognized the importance of the
"immigrant" or "ethnic" vote in attaining election. Both the right and
the left courted this vote and sold the concept of a multicultural Australia.24 9 This coincided with changing patterns of immigration. The past
European bias was replaced, and great numbers of Asians arrived to
settle. Once established, Australians generally found they had little to
fear from these changes. Indeed, possible gains were recognized in the
blending of cultures. In rancorous Australian political affairs, one of the
few matters of bipartisan agreement is policy in immigration and ethnic
2 50

affairs.

freedom of religion, and to ensure fair terms for persons whose property is acquired by any government.
Id.
245. Constitution Alteration (Aboriginals), Act No. 55, 1 AUSTL. ACTS P. § 2, at 49
(1974); see Lindell, The Corporationsand Races Powers, 14 FED. L. REV. 219, 243

(1984).
246. See Toohey, Aboriginal Land, 15 FED. L. REv. 159 (1985).
247. See, e.g., Milirrpum v. Nabalco Pty. Ltd., 17 F.L.R. 141 (1971).
248. For details and commentary, see Starke, supra note 2.
249.

R.

TERRILL,

supra note 71; R. SESTITO,

THE POLITICS OF MULTICULTURAL-

ISm (1982).
250. This tenet is now re-established after a leadership battle in the Australian Liberal Party. Canberra Times, May 10, 1989, § 1, at 9, col. 3.
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The courts, too, in landmark cases, have supported the aims of racial
equality. For example, the constitutionality of the Racial Discrimination
Act was affirmed,2 5 and a challenge to the South Australian Pitjantjatjara Land Rights Act, 1981, as violating the Commonwealth's Racial Discrimination Act, was turned aside.252 The changing Australian
perspective has joined with an international ethos hostile to racism as
Australia has asserted its voice before international fora and drawn
closer, by dint of technological change, with the rest of the world.2 53
These matters tip the balance in favor of change, but not toward the
change proposed by the Commission.
C.

The Weaknesses of the Recommendations

The recommendations fail to take seriously enough the free speech
rules of a democratic society. Even if one is to agree that Australian
public culture accepts this type of regulation, and given the subject matter public opinion would support it, free speech values are wantonly
ignored.
The danger is two-fold. In the first place, the legislative scheme exemplifies an unrealistic faith in the efficacy of legislation; it contemplates a
vigorous implementation to give defamed groups a fair go. The noble
intentions may be applauded, but unless tempered with a wisdom of the
realities, a frustration born of these noble intentions can easily result in
governmental overreaching. And here the second point becomes pertinent. The governmental overreaching is facilitated by the very cornerstone of the Commission's recommendation. The implementation of the
legislation would be in the hands of the Commission itself. The mission
of the Commission is clear: to stamp out racial defamation. Indubitably,
the role and jurisdiction of the Commission will be self-servingly construed to enhance that mission.2" 4 Lacking is the tradition, the innovation, the self-restraint and the independence of the courts. The selection
of an institution is critical, and the probability of a self-serving Commission bent on its own moral certainty leaves little room for the more elu-

251. Koowarta v. Bjelke-Peterson, 153 C.L.R. 168 (1982).
252. Gerhardy v. Brown, 59 Austl. L.J. Rep. 311 (1985).
253. Cf 59 Austl. L.J. Rep. at 335.
254. Like Macbeth:
I have no spur
To prick the sides of my intent, but only
Vaulting ambition, which o'erleaps itself...
W. SHAKESPEARE, Macbeth I. vii. 25-27, in THE ARDEN EDITION
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE 40 (K. Murr ed. 1962).

OF THE WORKS OF
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sive values of free speech elaborated herein.
The process also flouts a fundamental of effective conciliation, that the
conciliating body should not also be an investigative body.2 55 The investigative process may channel conclusions contrary to the independence
needed for conciliation. Conciliation, or mediation, can be most valuable
in resolving disputes, in encouraging new views, and especially in humanizing social interactions. The process in relation to divorce serves
that very function. Fundamental to this, however, is the conciliator's independence from any preestablished agenda, and in particular the articulation of any conclusions of right or wrong.2 56 Conciliation would be
fatuous if performed by a body representing, say, the interests of men in
divorce.
The Commission, it should be said, is not a Star Chamber. Its powers
are limited, and administrative law will check abuses. Nevertheless, the
Commissioner may investigate and call parties together for conciliation.
The discretion is ample to keep at bay close judicial scrutiny. Consequently, a zealous interpretation of racial defamation may chill legitimate speech. For example, the Commission could act in respect of public
debate on immigration policies. 5'
The eschewal of criminal law and, in its stead, the promotion of conciliation procedures reduces the strength of free speech objections.2" 8 But
this does not acknowledge the absence in the conciliation process of the
protections of the criminal law. The machinery may be easily invoked,
and an adverse conciliation finding can have a powerful stigmatizing effect on a person not far removed from the stain of criminal prosecution.

255. For criticism of combining investigative and conciliation roles, see Tarnopolsky,
supra note 189, at 577.
256. See Family Law Amendment Act 1976, AUSTL. ACTS P. § 7 (1976) (amending
§ 14 of the Family Law Act, no. 53 of 1975). See also Drake, Conciliation-TheAustralian Experience, 15 FAM. L. 65 (1985). See generally [Austl.]: Moloney, Divorce
,Counselling: Conciliation at the Crossroads, 11 LEGAL SERVIcES BULL. 206 (1986);
[U.K.]: L. PARKINSON, CONCILIATION IN SEPARATION AND DIVORCE (1986); [U.S.]:
Phear, Family Mediation: A Choice of Options, 39 ARB. J. 22, 24 (1984) (distinguishing
conciliation from mediation: "[t]he conciliator is often not a truly neutral third party and
usually refrains from either structuring the process or from actively helping to reach an
agreement"); Maxwell, Keeping the Family out of Court: Court-OrderedMediations of
Custody Disputes Under the Kansas Statutes, 25 WASHBURN L.J. 203, 204 (1986)
("[t]he decisions are made solely by the parties themselves; the mediator does not decide
any of the issues for the parties").
257. Cf PROPOSAL FOR AMENDMENTS, supra note 220, at 19. A defense for "noninflammatory discussion of issues of public policy" leaves a gateway for a coach and
fours to ride through.
258. Id. para. 61, at 18.
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Although the Act requires confidentiality for the conciliation proceeding,
it would seem that remedies do have a chastening effect, and to educate
publicly would require publicity. The established press, in particular,
may be dissuaded from furthering public debate because its reputation
for fairness may be put in issue by the mere initiation of an investigation. The more established the press the less likely it would be that the
dispute could be contained at the conciliation level. As defamation law
experience shows, the press is reluctant to capitulate. 5 9
Ironically, the conciliation process would seem more likely to have an
initial impact on fringe groups that disseminate racial defamation. But
this is largely illusory, and its impact merely evanescent, for these groups
are often loosely structured and of short duration. An apology may be
made and the immediate threat of legal sanction averted, and the unrepentant individuals may live racially to traduce another day. This twotiered impact would undermine the efficacy of the Commission's proposed scheme. The visible protagonist (and scapegoat) would be the
respected, established press, where the merit of the free speech claim is
at its greatest. The fungibility of the gutter press would render it immune from effective sanction. The worst of all worlds may result: an
unrestricted stream of vitriolic racial defamation, set against the apparent muffling of the established press. The corrosive power of this state of
affairs should be apparent, and eventually the Commission would suffer
in the entirety of its functions.
In sum, the Commission's recommendations have fundamental weaknesses. Not only do they pose an unacceptable inhibition to free speech,
but they may weaken the capacity of the Commission to perform its established various functions.
D.

A Short Commentary on the Common Law

If the courts have the institutional advantage argued for, it should be
asked whether they should develop the common law to afford relief to
the members of the traduced racial groups.
The common law did not address itself to an individual's interest to be
free of discrimination on the basis of race.26 To be actionable, some
259.

R. BEZANSON, G. CRANBERG & J. SOLOSKi, LIBEL LAW AND THE PRESS:
& REALITY (1987). For an appraisal of the extent of litigation in Australia, see
Unfair Publication: Defamation and Privacy, The Law Reform Comm. Report No. 11,
MYTH

at 17-33 (1979).
260. Cf. A. LESTER & G. BINDMAN, RACE AND LAW IN GREAT BRITAIN 336
(1972) (citing Constantine v. Imperial Hotels, Ltd., 1944 K.B. 693; awarding nominal
damages for exclusion from a London hotel on racial grounds). See also Puerto Rican
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recognized interest had to be shown to be invaded.26 ' Defamation law
protects reputation; reputation is a valuable property interest that, like
other individual interests, is protected from unjustified invasion. The
standard for gauging whether the publication constituted defamatory
matter is the ordinary right-thinking member of the public. The question
is whether the material will tend either to lower the reputation of the
person identified or to encourage persons to shun and avoid him.2 62 But
reputation is established within a social setting and hence reflects the
mores, although racist, of that society; so it was once held that to call a
white person a "black" is defamatory.26 To call a person "black" today
would not be defamatory-not because of the court's repugnance of racism, but rather because of the changing community standard that no
longer sees a "black" person as inferior.2 64
The rationale that reputation is a protected property interest has attracted the argument that the courts should recognize a right also subsisting in groups. A defamatory imputation directed at a racial or ethnic
group unavoidably discredits all members of that group,26 and this has
an adverse impact on the capacity of those persons conducting their affairs in society. This is exacerbated in societies comprised of diverse racial and ethnic groups.
The courts have never accepted such a broad argument. At best, the
courts have allowed an action for defamatory matter addressed to a
group, which matter could be reasonably understood as identifying individual members of that group.266 To say, "All lawyers are thieves" is not

Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Grace, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1514, 1516 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.

1983).
261. In the American context a well-known case stretching existing categories to
cover a racial insult is Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc., 424 S.W. 2d 627 (Tex.
1967).
262. Yousoupoff v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures, 50 T.L.R. 581, 587 (C.A.
1934); see also H. STREET, THE LAW OF TORTS 292 (6th ed. 1976). In the United
States, see Belli v. Orlando Daily Newspapers, 389 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 825; Grant v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 151 F.2d 733 (2nd Cir. 1945).
263. Natchez Times Publising Co. v. Dunigan, 72 So.2d 681 (Miss. 1954).
264. Gatley, supra note 203, § 47.
265. Tanenhaus, Group Libel, 35 CORNELL L.Q. 261 (1950).
266. F. HARPER, F. JAMES,& 0. GRAY, 2 THE LAW OF TORTS § 5.7 (2d ed.
1986). See also McCullough v. Cities Service, 676 P.2d 833, 837 (Okla. 1984) (setting
forth the intensity of suspicion test); Brady v. Ottaway Newspapers, 84 A.D. 2d 226, 445
N.Y.S. 2d 786 (1981) (police department members could maintain a defamation action
for a statement suggesting the members must have known of departmental wrongdoings);
Fawcett Publications, Inc. v. Morris, 377 P.2d 42 (Okla. 1962) (fullback could maintain
a defamation action for a statement alleging that the members of the team were using
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actionable, for no particular lawyer is identified, and no specifiable harm
is suffered.2 67 The reason for caution is stated by the House of Lords in
Knupffer v. London Express Newspaper, Ltd.:
The reason why a libel published of a large or indeterminate number of
persons described by some general name generally fails to be actionable is
the difficulty of establishing that the plaintiff was, in fact, included in the
defamatory statement, for the habit of making unfounded generalizations
is ingrained in ill-educated or vulgar minds, or the words are occasionally
intended to be a facetious exaggeration.268
Endeavors to prompt the courts to move defamation law from its individualistic stance have been largely abandoned in recent times. The sweep
of free speech rhetoric is part of the reason. Another is frustration with
judicial timidity, and hence for traduced groups, a turning of the lobbying energies to the legislature.
It is ironic that now is a favorable time, especially in the United
States, to revivify the tort suggestions. To be sure, free speech rhetoric is
still a formidable barrier-although some fissures may be discerned.
Nonetheless, the law of torts has begun to change its focus from the
individual to wider, extra-individual interests. The mass tort phenomenon of recent years has jettisoned many individualistic tort notions in the
interests of public regulation. Rules of causation and burden of proof
have been manipulated to afford recovery to classes of plaintiffs who
would have failed under traditional notions. The courts have turned the
law of torts into a formidable remedial engine to serve public law
ends.26 More widely than tort law, group-oriented claims are increasamphetamines).
267. Eastwood v. Holmes, 175 Eng. Rep. 758, 759 (1858). But if the words are
placed on the door of an attorney's home, the offense is actionable. The celebrated American decision of Neiman-Marcus v. Lait, 13 F.R.D. 311 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) nicely highlights ihe law. The statement that some Neiman-Marcus models are call girls-the "top
babes in town"-was actionable by a model, but the statement that "the salesgirls are
good, too-pretty, and often much cheaper . . ." was not actionable by the 382 saleswomen, although the twenty-five salesmen had actions for an imputation that they were
homosexuals. Id. at 313.

268. 1944 C.A. 116, 122.
269. See Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3
(1986); Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law"
Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849 (1984).
Strangely, the silence has been deafening in relation to group defamation. It is not
possible to pursue this topic, except to hint that given adequate free speech protections,
the logic of the mass torts may be transferred to group racial defamation. I hasten to add
that Australian courts are some distance from this. Unlike United States procedure, class
actions are narrowly confined. Moreover, the contingency fee, which fuels the American

19891

RACIALLY DEFAMATORY SPEECH

ingly made through litigation.2 7 °
For American courts the barrier to development is the broad interpretation of the first amendment. It would be a brave court indeed that
found racial defamation actionable. Nevertheless, the tide may be ebbing.
Despite the Supreme Court's determination that the Reverend Jerry
Falwell lacked a good action against Hustler magazine for intentional
infliction of emotional distress,271 the Court may not view the question
similarly outside the area of a public figure parody. In Falwell, the
Court stressed the need for robustness of speech where such parodies are
concerned. 27 2 In contrast, racial speech shares no long and esteemed tradition of speech in political discourse in America. It is noteworthy that
the Court was prepared to admit limits to free speech, that "not all
speech is of equal First Amendment importance". 27a The exceptions articulated were two: first, for "vulgar," "offensive," and "shocking"
speech2 74 and second, for "fighting" words.2 76 This may well be a firm
foundation upon which to build an argument that racial defamation is
not speech worthy of first amendment protection. 6
Blind categorization under the absolute first amendment interpretation
carries high social costs that could be ameliorated by a sensitive balancing of the public interest in free speech against important private interests that make a society a more rewarding one in which to live.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The challenge in this area is not to justify government action but to
ensure that its form does not destroy the very reasons for intervention. In
class action, is unethical in the Australian setting. For Australian courts these are obstacles of some moment and with legislatures in the Benthamite mold amenable to change, it
is understandable that effort has been directed there.
270. See Prichard, supra note 181, at 469.
271. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988); see also notes 182-186,
supra, and accompanying text. See generally Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club,
595 F.2d 1265, 1273 (3rd Cir. 1979) (recognizing tort action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress in connection with defamation action); Vietnamese Fishermen's Ass'n
v. Knights of K.K.K., 518 F. Supp. 993 (S.D. Tex. 1981) (court issuing declaratory and
injunctive relief for Vietnamese shrimp fishermen against self-help tactics of violence and
intimidation).
272. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. at 51.
273. 108 S. Ct. at 882 (quoting Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,
472 U.S. 749, 758 (1985)).
274. Id. (citing F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 747 (1978)).
275. Id. (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942)).

276.

Cf Smolla, Emotional Distress and the FirstAmendment: An Analysis of Hus-

tler v. Falwell, 20 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 423, 443-444 (1988).
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other words, government action to protect individual autonomy may undermine that autonomy. In essence, this explains the favored American
first amendment interpretation. Any concession to governmental regulation lays a foundation for broader, and hence overreaching, regulation. It
makes for greater certainty to deny that government has any function-that there is any foundation for government action. 2 "
In the end this attitude is predicated upon the villainy of government.
But there is no need to assume the posture of a full-blown statist to
assert that this is a rather sterile view of modern government. I have
provided reasons to encourage government's role as speaker especially in
encouraging and supporting racial minorities to join in the life a nation.
Now I am faced with a task avoided by a broad first amendment view.
It is to cabin racial defamation reforms so as not to erode legitimate free
speech.
My approach is to concede the imperfectability of our society and to
give free speech exercise a firm legitimizing presumption. In consequence, I propose that governmental action must be mainly symbolic. In
addition, the implementation of any reforms should reside in the courts
as an institution with a comparative advantage and competence. The
shape of reform will eventually be determined by the prevailing public
culture. Let me suggest, therefore, two reforms; both are modest and
make no claims of efficacy in ridding our society of racial defamation.
The first would invest the courts with jurisdiction to make a declaratory judgment.2 7 8 The court could be requested by persons allegedly de-

famed by racial, ethnic, or religious slur to declare that the matter was
published falsely and maliciously defamed them. Accordingly, a person
should be able to urge that immigration be restricted to the English.
However, it would be defamatory for the published material to add that
Asians are filthy or inferior.2 9 Bona fide scientific and political debate
should not be subjected to such a declaratory judgment.

277. See Schauer, supra note 114.
278. It is noteworthy that reform suggestions in American defamation law have
urged that reliance upon damages awards be replaced by declaratory judgments; see THE
LIBEL REFORM PROJECT OF THE ANNENBERG WASHINGTON PROGRAM, PROPOSAL

FOR THE REFORM OF LIBEL LAW 11 (1988); earlier parallel suggestions were made by

Franklin, Good Names and Bad Law: A Critique of Libel Law & a Proposal, 18
U.S.F. L. Rev. 1 (1983); Note, The Defamed Reputation: Will DeclaratoryJudgment
Bill Provide Vindication? 13 J. LEGIs. 72 (1986); see also Vietnamese Fisherman's
Assn'n v. Knights of K.K.K., 518 F. Supp. 993 (S.D. Tex. 1981).

279. See Arkes, Civility and the Restrictionof Speech: Rediscovering the Defamation

of Groups, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 281 (expressing the view that this task is too distasteful
for courts).
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An issue arises whether representative bodies of racial or ethnic
groups should be given standing to bring class or representative actions.
Aborigines are not monolithic in their views. Many may object to an
action brought on their behalf by, say, the Northern Lands Council established under the Northern Territory Land Rights legislation to make
claims and administer traditional lands.2 s° But such bodies will have the
information and resources to enforce rights. Perhaps rules could require
a sampling of views in order to grant standing. The rules also may encourage intervention by individuals and groups objecting to the action.
The procedure could be similar to that required under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure for the validation of class actions.2 s1
The standard for liability should parallel the United States Constitutional law gloss placed upon the common law of defamation. Consequently, the sting of the publication should be to expose members of the
group to "distrust, hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy. ' 282 This is
judged by the standards of the ordinary members of the community. 2 "
More critically, the burden should be placed on the plaintiff to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that the defendant intended the words to
have the disparaging effect.28 4 The plaintiff would have the burden of

280. Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976, No. 191, 1976 Austl.
Acts, § 23(1)(2), § 25(2)(3), at 1617, 1633-34, 1634-55 [hereinafter Aboriginal Land
Rights Act].
281. The Aboriginal Land Commission operates as a representative and is functionally similar to the representation of a class under the United States Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. See id. § 50-53, at 1645-47; cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. rule 23(c) (1988).
However, the concern for absentee plaintiff in Fed. R. Civ. P. rule 23(c)(2) and for fair
and adequate representation of the class in Fed. R. Civ. P. rule 23(a) are not developed
in the Aboriginal Land Rights Act. The aboriginal land councils do provide legal counsel
and assistance when claims are brought, and they currently ensure group consent and
typicality of claims concerning land management. See Aboriginal Land Rights Act, supra
note 280, § 23(1)(2), at 1633-34. The concerted actions of the land councils and the
Commissioner might parallel the validation procedures for class actions. See id. §
25(2)(3), at 1634-35, § 50-51, at 1645-47.
282. Briggs v. Brown, 55 Fla. 417, 430, 46 So. 325, 330 (1908).
283. The verbal formula employed has led to a divergence between the English and
American courts. The former, and the Commonwealth, required that the words be
judged from the point of view of "right thinking" members of the community. See Byrne
v. Deane, [1937] 1 K.B. 818 (C.A.); see also Reader's Digest Services Pty Ltd. v. Lamb,
38 A.L.R. 417 (1982) (endorsing the "reasonable men," "right-thinking members of society generally," or "ordinary men not avid for scandal" tests. The latter determines the
issue according to the view of a "substantial and respectable minority"); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 comment e (1977).
284. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 332.
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showing that the imputation was false.28 5
A difficult issue arises whether reckless disregard to the truth ought to
be actionable.2 8 For example, a publisher may write that Jews have
purposely lied about the historical fact of the Holocaust.28 7 If this is published with reckless disregard to its truth but without any belief that it is
untrue, it should not be actionable. Free speech requires a wide margin
of safety. The strict requirement of intention will not create major obstacles, because this kind of statement in the publications of concern is usually set amongst a barrage of lies and insinuations, the total effect of
which is to impeach any argument that the publisher did not know that
the factual imputations were untrue.
In addition, prudence dictates that the matter be published to the public or a segment of the public. Private conversations and arguments are
often vituperative but have little lasting residue. It is inappropriate for
the apparatus of the courts to be drawn into private disputes in this area.
A sufficient degree of publicness is required so that the law is not invoked in paltry disputes far better settled by informal means. Race discrimination laws in the Commonwealth and in the United States have
respected the public/private line.28 8 A person may be a private bigot28 9
but that only becomes the business of the law when that person's actions
achieve a required degree of publicness' 9 0 To be sure this demarcation
line is one not easily drawn.2 '

285. Philadelphia Newspaper v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776-77 (1986).
286. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265-92 (1964).
287. See Stein, supra note 17; see also Correspondence, On the "Auschwitz Lie," 87
MICH. L. REV. 1026 (1989).
288. Note, Section 1981 and Private Groups: The Right to Discriminate versus
Freedomfrom Discrimination, 84 YALE L.J. 1441 (1975).
289. Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 313 (Goldberg, J. concurring).
290. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall ... deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of the law; nor deny... the equal protection of
the laws") (emphasis added) has been interpreted to apply only to the state and not to
private individuals). See The Civil Rights Cases 109 U.S. 3 (1883); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966);
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982). Cf [U.K.] Race Relations Act §
6(1)(b) (1965) ("[w]ith intent to stur up hatred against any section of the public. . . in
any public place or at any public meeting . . ."); [Canada] Constitutional Act of 1981,
CAN. CONST. Part III, § 36(1)(a)(c) (Parliament, legislatures, and governments of Canada are committed to "promoting equal opportunities for the well-being of Canadians..
. providing essential public services ... to all Canadians"); [Australia] Racial Discrimination Act 1975, No. 52175 Austl. Acts, §§ 9, 11, at 347, 352-53 (unlawful to refuse
access to public places and facilities).
291. [U.S.] Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969). Cf Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,
407 U.S. 163 (1972); New York State Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York, 108 S. Ct.
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A treacherous reef in these suggestions is revealed when we ask
whether opinion should be actionable. We have the strong principle well
grounded in liberal theory that "[u]nder the First Amendment there is
no such thing as a false idea."29' 2 But this begs the vexed question of
what constitutes an opinion. The distinction between opinion and fact
has received extensive but, as yet, unclear analysis. 93 At common law
the defense of fair comment on a matter of public interest represents one
of the defenses often relied upon by the press.2 94 A publication should be
actionable only when it directly, or by necessary implication, asserts false
facts about the group.
Doubtless this may have some chilling effect, but the effect would be
slight and, in my view, the benefit more substantial. It may make publishers pause, but this is salutory. It may also lead to more artful libel
posing as scientific debate. This may redouble the defamatory sting by
clothing it in a way that is more acceptable to the wider public. My
suggestion puts faith in the courts to uncover conceit, and definitively to
put the lie to false quasi-scientific theories.
It may be objected that this process would both dignify and magnify
the impact of the defamer and the defamatory statement. Doubtless this
is true, but the person bringing the action (the best judge of this matter)
may always weigh this as a factor in deciding whether to initiate the
action for the declaration.295
The declaratory judgment, or fair comment on it, could be published
in the press, and this would attract absolute privilege under defamation
law. No enforcement consequences would flow from the declaration.

2225 (1988); Comment, New York State Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York: Private
Club Sex Discrimination,91 W. VA. L. REV. 503 (1989); [U.K.] see Panama (Piccadilly) Ltd. v. Newberry, 1 W.L.R. 610 (1962); but see Severn View Social Club and
Institute Ltd. v. Chepstow (Monmouthshire) Justices, 1 W.L.R. 1512 (1968).
292. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974).
293. Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127
(1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
294. See Law Reform Commission, Unfair Publication: Defamation and Privacy,
1979, AGPS Report No. 11, at 67-70.
295. To rest the power to initiate in the defamed class identifies an advantage over
the process suggested by the Human Rights Commission, which would allow bureaucrats
to initiate any action. Those persons are more likely to be blind to the problem of dignifying the defamer and the defamation. Contrariwise, the group may be reluctant to initiate an action for reasons that this may signal weakness or undue reliance on government,
and hence a right for government to initiate could be justified. For a discussion of the
limits of privately initiated litigation in regard to some "public" rights, see Stewart &
Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1195, 1235-36
(1982). On balance it is better to keep this from bureaucratic enforcement.
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My second, and alternative, suggestion comports with a more
Benthamite public culture and I think will be acceptable in societies less
suspicious of positive governmental functions than is the United States.
Individuals or a duly constituted representative class of a racial, ethnic or
religious group may be enabled by legislation to bring an action for damages. The matter complained of must be false and malicious and serve no
bona fide scientific or political debate. Any damages should be limited to
a prescribed amount, say $100,000. No injunctive remedy would be
available.
In Australia, it will be necessary to modify the legal cost rules to enable lawyers to represent the class on a contingency fee basis. Alternatively, and less neatly, a public fund could be established to support the
litigation costs.
Although I consider that this provision may be more compatible with
Benthamite Australia,2 96 this is not to say that in the United States context the suggestion will be futile. My suggestion, it should be recalled, is
akin to that of Justice Jackson's in Beauharnais.17 It is by no means
certain that public culture will continue to reflect the present suspicion
of government.
For all the contrasts I have drawn between American and Commonwealth public culture, the tradition of free speech is central to a rule of
law in a liberal democratic society. 8 I would urge that Australian reformers not be inveigled into copying other Commonwealth reforms. Nor
should they be dissuaded from acting because of the present American
broad view of the first amendment. A sensitive analysis will give great
deference to free speech, but still it is not a trump card that will defeat
all other values.2 9" Whichever path is taken by reformers in Australia or
elsewhere, it should be realized that our choices are at best imperfect.
The perfect may be the enemy of the best-our best is a free, robust,
vigorous society where all individuals may participate with dignity.

296. See
297.

RESTRAINING LEVIATHAN:

supra note 69.

See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 287, 304-305 (1952).

298. For a comprehensive application, see G. WALKER,
DATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY

stitutional definition).
299. F. SCHAUER, supra note 73, at 9.
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23-42 (1988) (proposing a twelve point in-

